

**SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE
STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE,
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND
TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

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Review of the operation and status of the Convention

**REVIEW OF THE OPERATION AND STATUS OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION
AND TRANSFER OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR
DESTRUCTION: 2005-2009**

PART II

Submitted by the President-Designate of the Second Review Conference *

* / Submitted after due date and as soon as received by the Secretariat.

Annex I

States that have ratified or acceded to the Convention

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
Afghanistan	11 September 2002	1 March 2003
Albania	29 February 2000	1 August 2000
Algeria	9 October 2001	1 April 2002
Andorra	29 June 1998	1 March 1999
Angola	5 July 2002	1 January 2003
Antigua and Barbuda	3 May 1999	1 November 1999
Argentina	14 September 1999	1 March 2000
Australia	14 January 1999	1 July 1999
Austria	29 June 1998	1 March 1999
Bahamas	31 July 1998	1 March 1999
Bangladesh	6 September 2000	1 March 2001
Barbados	26 January 1999	1 July 1999
Belarus	3 September 2003	1 March 2004
Belgium	4 September 1998	1 March 1999
Belize	23 April 1998	1 March 1999
Benin	25 September 1998	1 March 1999
Bhutan	18 August 2005	1 February 2006
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	9 June 1998	1 March 1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8 September 1998	1 March 1999
Botswana	1 March 2000	1 September 2000
Brazil	30 April 1999	1 October 1999
Brunei Darussalam	24 April 2006	1 October 2006
Bulgaria	4 September 1998	1 March 1999
Burkina Faso	16 September 1998	1 March 1999
Burundi	22 October 2003	1 April 2004
Cambodia	28 July 1999	1 January 2000
Cameroon	19 September 2002	1 March 2003
Canada	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
Cape Verde	14 May 2001	1 November 2001
Central African Republic	8 November 2002	1 May 2003
Chad	6 May 1999	1 November 1999
Chile	10 September 2001	1 March 2002
Colombia	6 September 2000	1 March 2001
Comoros	19 September 2002	1 March 2003
Congo (Brazzaville)	4 May 2001	1 November 2001
Cook Islands	15 March 2006	1 September 2006
Costa Rica	17 March 1999	1 September 1999
Côte d'Ivoire	30 June 2000	1 December 2000

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
Croatia	20 May 1998	1 March 1999
Cyprus	17 January 2003	1 July 2003
Czech Republic	26 October 1999	1 April 2000
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2 May 2002	1 November 2002
Denmark	8 June 1998	1 March 1999
Djibouti	18 May 1998	1 March 1999
Dominica	26 March 1999	1 September 1999
Dominican Republic	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
Ecuador	29 April 1999	1 October 1999
El Salvador	27 January 1999	1 July 1999
Equatorial Guinea	16 September 1998	1 March 1999
Eritrea	27 August 2001	1 February 2002
Estonia	12 May 2004	1 November 2004
Ethiopia	17 December 2004	1 June 2005
Fiji	10 June 1998	1 March 1999
France	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
Gabon	8 September 2000	1 March 2001
Gambia	23 September 2002	1 March 2003
Germany	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
Ghana	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
Greece	25 September 2003	1 March 2004
Grenada	19 August 1998	1 March 1999
Guatemala	26 March 1999	1 September 1999
Guinea	8 October 1998	1 April 1999
Guinea Bissau	22 May 2001	1 November 2001
Guyana	5 August 2003	1 February 2004
Haiti	15 February 2006	1 August 2006
Holy See	17 February 1998	1 March 1999
Honduras	24 September 1998	1 March 1999
Hungary	6 April 1998	1 March 1999
Iceland	5 May 1999	1 November 1999
Indonesia	16 February 2007	1 August 2007
Iraq	15 August 2007	1 February 2008
Ireland	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
Italy	23 April 1999	1 October 1999
Jamaica	17 July 1998	1 March 1999
Japan	30 September 1998	1 March 1999
Jordan	13 November 1998	1 May 1999
Kenya	23 January 2001	1 July 2001
Kiribati	7 September 2000	1 March 2001
Kuwait	30 July 2007	1 January 2008

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
Latvia	1 July 2005	1 January 2006
Lesotho	2 December 1998	1 June 1999
Liberia	23 December 1999	1 June 2000
Liechtenstein	5 October 1999	1 April 2000
Lithuania	12 May 2003	1 November 2003
Luxembourg	14 June 1999	1 December 1999
Madagascar	16 September 1999	1 March 2000
Malawi	13 August 1998	1 March 1999
Malaysia	22 April 1999	1 October 1999
Maldives	7 September 2000	1 March 2001
Mali	2 June 1998	1 March 1999
Malta	7 May 2001	1 November 2001
Mauritania	21 July 2000	1 January 2001
Mauritius	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
Mexico	9 June 1998	1 March 1999
Monaco	17 November 1998	1 May 1999
Montenegro	23 October 2006	1 April 2007
Mozambique	25 August 1998	1 March 1999
Namibia	21 September 1998	1 March 1999
Nauru	7 August 2000	1 February 2001
Netherlands	12 April 1999	1 October 1999
New Zealand	27 January 1999	1 July 1999
Nicaragua	30 November 1998	1 May 1999
Niger	23 March 1999	1 September 1999
Nigeria	27 September 2001	1 March 2002
Niue	15 April 1998	1 March 1999
Norway	9 July 1998	1 March 1999
Palau	18 November 2007	1 May 2008
Panama	7 October 1998	1 April 1999
Papua New Guinea	28 June 2004	1 December 2004
Paraguay	13 November 1998	1 May 1999
Peru	17 June 1998	1 March 1999
Philippines	15 February 2000	1 August 2000
Portugal	19 February 1999	1 August 1999
Qatar	13 October 1998	1 April 1999
Republic of Moldova	8 September 2000	1 March 2001
Romania	30 November 2000	1 May 2001
Rwanda	8 June 2000	1 December 2000
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2 December 1998	1 June 1999
Saint Lucia	13 April 1999	1 October 1999
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1 August 2001	1 February 2002

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
Samoa	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
San Marino	18 March 1998	1 March 1999
Sao Tome and Principe	31 March 2003	1 September 2003
Senegal	24 September 1998	1 March 1999
Serbia	18 September 2003	1 March 2004
Seychelles	2 June 2000	1 December 2000
Sierra Leone	25 April 2001	1 October 2001
Slovakia	25 February 1999	1 August 1999
Slovenia	27 October 1998	1 April 1999
Solomon Islands	26 January 1999	1 July 1999
South Africa	26 June 1998	1 March 1999
Spain	19 January 1999	1 July 1999
Sudan	13 October 2003	1 April 2004
Suriname	23 May 2002	1 November 2002
Swaziland	22 December 1998	1 June 1999
Sweden	30 November 1998	1 May 1999
Switzerland	24 March 1998	1 March 1999
Tajikistan	12 October 1999	1 April 2000
Thailand	27 November 1998	1 May 1999
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	9 September 1998	1 March 1999
Timor-Leste	7 May 2003	1 November 2003
Togo	9 March 2000	1 September 2000
Trinidad and Tobago	27 April 1998	1 March 1999
Tunisia	9 July 1999	1 January 2000
Turkey	25 September 2003	1 March 2004
Turkmenistan	19 January 1998	1 March 1999
Uganda	25 February 1999	1 August 1999
Ukraine	27 December 2005	1 June 2006
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	31 July 1998	1 March 1999
United Republic of Tanzania	13 November 2000	1 May 2001
Uruguay	7 June 2001	1 December 2001
Vanuatu	16 September 2005	1 March 2006
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14 April 1999	1 October 1999
Yemen	1 September 1998	1 March 1999
Zambia	23 February 2001	1 August 2001
Zimbabwe	18 June 1998	1 March 1999

Annex II

Acceptance of the Convention's norms by States not Parties

Table 1: Status of the acceptance of the Convention's norms by States not parties

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Armenia ¹	In favour	Armenia has expressed its willingness to accede to the Convention perceiving it as one of the instruments for elimination of an entire category of excessively injurious conventional weapons.	Armenia's accession to the Convention is contingent upon the readiness of other countries of the region to adhere to the Convention and complex with its regime.		

¹ Statement distributed by Armenia at the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties, Geneva, 18-22 September 2006.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Azerbaijan ²	In favour	Azerbaijan fully supports the comprehensive ban and destruction of anti-personnel landmines and envisaged the full ban and destruction of those mines throughout the world as an impetus to global security and welfare.	Azerbaijan has not acceded to the Convention since it was forced to use mines as a measure of containment from possible hostilities. Azerbaijan could not accede to the Convention without settlement of an armed conflict with a neighbouring State and the restoration of its territorial integrity and removal of the threat of resumption of hostility, even though it had stopped planting additional mines. Adherence to the Convention would only be possible after the final settlement of the conflict with the neighbouring State in question.	yes ³	
Bahrain ⁴	In favour	Bahrain shares the Convention's good cause and is aware that landmines will not solve any problems but rather create others.		yes	
China ⁵	In favour	China appreciates the humanitarianism enshrined in the Convention and endorses its purposes and objectives.		yes	

² Debate on the draft UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

³ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 881.

⁴ According to the ICBL Mission Report, Advocacy Mission to Bahrain and Kuwait, 24-28 March 2006

⁵ Statement of China to the Ninth Meeting of the States Parties, November 2008.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Cuba ⁶	Abstained		Cuba is under aggression from the only super-power in the world and, as such, is unable to accede in order to protect its sovereignty. It would continue to support all efforts by maintaining a necessary balance and working to minimise the effects of anti-personnel mines on civilian populations, particularly their indiscriminate and irresponsible use.		
Egypt ⁷	Abstained	Egypt had imposed a moratorium on landmines long before the conclusion of the Convention.	Egypt state that the Convention is unbalanced as it does not acknowledge the responsibilities of States that had laid mines on other territories, as was the case in Egypt, where mines had been planted by Second World War powers.	yes ⁸	
Finland ⁹	In favour	Finland will accede to the Convention in 2012 and will destroy its landmines by the end of 2016.	Finland's credible defence capability will be maintained by acquiring systems to replace landmines in the period 2009-2016. In order to replace anti-personnel mines' effect, extra funding of € 200 million will be included in the spending limits of the defence establishment 2009-2016 for the procurement of systems to replace the anti-personnel mines.	yes	

⁶ Debate on the draft UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

⁷ Explanation of vote on the UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

⁸ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 905.

⁹ Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 and 2009.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Georgia ¹⁰	In favour	Georgia has never produced anti-personnel mines and doesn't retain the option to produce them. In 1996, the President of Georgia declared a moratorium on producing, importing and using anti-personnel mines.	Due to existing circumstances, it is not reasonable to join the Convention. The main reasons for not acceding to the Convention are the occupied territories and unstable environment surrounding them. This situation will prevent Georgia from the fulfilment of Convention obligations.	yes	
India ¹¹	Abstained	India supports the vision of a world free of the threat of anti-personnel landmines. Since 1997, India has discontinued the production of non-detectable anti-personnel mines and has observed a moratorium on their transfer.	India supports the approach, enshrined in CCW Amended Protocol II, to which it is a state party which addresses the legitimate defence requirements of States, especially those with long borders. The availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform, cost-effectively, the legitimate defensive role of anti personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines.	yes ¹²	
Iran ¹³	Abstained	Iran fully shares and sympathises with the concern of the international community over the tragic consequences of anti-personnel mines.	Particular security concerns of states should be effectively addressed. Searching for an alternative defensive means to replace anti-personnel mines is of major importance.	yes	

¹⁰ Information transmitted by the Permanent Mission of Georgia (Geneva) to the ISU, 15 October 2009.

¹¹ Explanation of vote on the UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

¹² Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 932.

¹³ Statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Signing Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 4 December 1997.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Israel ¹⁴	Abstained	Israel joins all those countries in supporting international efforts to resolve the problem of indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines.	Due to our unique situation in the Middle East involving an ongoing threat of hostilities as well as terrorist threats and actions along the borders, we are still obliged to maintain anti-personnel mines as necessary for self-defence in general and along borders in particular. Israel is unable to sign the Convention until effective alternative measures are available to ensure the protection of civilians threatened on a daily basis by terrorists and to ensure the protection of Israeli forces operating in areas of armed conflict.	yes	
Kazakhstan ¹⁵	In favour	Kazakhstan completely supports the humane orientation of the Convention.	Full destruction or even a moratorium on use of anti-personnel mines is unacceptable in the absence of an alternative system.	yes	
Korea, DPR of ¹⁶	Abstained		The DPR of Korea is not ready to accede given its complex security situation.	yes	
Korea, Republic of ¹⁷	Abstained	The Republic of Korea is concerned about and committed to mitigating human suffering, and is enforcing a moratorium on mine exports. It is also part of initiatives and trust funds on mine clearance and related humanitarian activities.		yes	

¹⁴ Statement by Israel to the Signing Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 4 December 1997.

¹⁵ Statement by the Chief of Special Troops Department of the Chief of Staff Committee of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Kazakhstan at the International Seminar “Confidence Building Measures and Regional Cooperation through Mine Action”, Almaty, 25-27 March 2007.

¹⁶ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 959.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Kyrgyzstan ¹⁸	Abstained	Kyrgyzstan supports the goal of a mine-free world.	Kyrgyzstan does not yet have the necessary alternatives for border defense, and it lacks financial and technical resources to implement the Convention.	yes	
Lao PDR ¹⁹	In favour	The Lao PDR will accede to the Convention; however, it requires some time to prepare itself in order to be able to meet its obligations fully and effectively. The Lao PDR does not produce or transfer anti-personnel mines.	The primary reason that makes us delay our accession is security reason and lack of readiness to fully meet our obligations under Ottawa Convention such as clearance. As the most affected nation on earth by cluster munitions (UXO), the Lao Government is heavily focusing on UXO clearance.	yes	
Lebanon ²⁰	Abstained		Lebanon is unable to join the treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel, and concerns about the security of its southern border.	yes	

¹⁷ Explanation of vote on the UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

¹⁸ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 969.

¹⁹ Information transmitted by the Permanent Mission of the Lao PDR (Geneva) to the ISU, 15 July 2009.

²⁰ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 991.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ²¹	Abstained		The Convention does not take into account the problem in an objective fashion. It had also not taken into account the concerns of a large number of UN Member States. The Convention had prohibited the use of mines by the most impoverished countries, which only used them to defend their borders. The treaty also did not take into account that the smaller, weaker countries were subjected to occupation and aggression.		
Marshall Islands ²²	In favour	The Marshall Islands remains committed to the general principles of the Convention. We have witnessed firsthand the violence of mine-based warfare and we hope that the world's future generations will not be burdened with this dangerous practice. The Republic of the Marshall Islands does not, and has not, produced landmines. There are no known stockpiles. The Republic of the Marshall Islands has no current or future intention of such production or stockpiling.	Our limited technical capacity, as well as a variety of immediate and pressing demands..., severely constrain our ability to respond to all of our complex treaty commitments....Great care must be taken regarding future national action regarding the Convention. Such action may require a highly-complex analysis which successfully integrates our multiple international commitments.	no	no

²¹ Debate on the draft UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

²² Statement by the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Micronesia, Federated States of ²³	In favour	The Government of the FSM has indicated its full support of the concept of universalisation and full implementation of the Convention. The FSM considers herself as a mine-free State. Regardless, the aspiration of the Government of the FSM to accede to the Convention remains intact.	The Government of the Federated States of Micronesia is very close to fulfilling its internal legal requirements in order to accede to the Convention. Presently, there is a draft resolution before the Congress of the FSM seeking approval to accede to the Convention.	no	no
Mongolia ²⁴	In favour	Mongolia fully supports the international community's effort and initiatives undertaken under the Convention. Mongolia is not a mine-affected country. Mongolia has never deployed and will never deploy landmines on its territory. Mongolia shall not transfer, acquire or place landmines and shall ensure a safe storage of its stocks.	Mongolia has "drafted an interagency action plan to implement our step-by-step accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, which will coordinate ministries' activities and create a legal, financial and technological foundation for it".	yes	no

²³ Statement by the Federated States of Micronesia to Ninth Meeting of the States Parties, 26 November 2008.

²⁴ Statement by Mongolia to the 25 May 2009 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention and statement delivered by Mongolia at the Second Review Conference, 1 December 2009.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Morocco ²⁵	In favour	Morocco fully subscribes and without reservations to the humanitarian principles and fundamental goals of the Convention. Morocco has been adhering to the Convention in a de facto sense. Morocco has never produced or transferred anti-personnel mines and has not used anti-personnel mines since well before the entry into force of the Convention.	Adhesion to the Convention is a strategic objective that would be achieved once security related to the protection of its southern provinces and territorial integrity is achieved.	no	no
Myanmar ²⁶	Abstained	Myanmar is, in principle, in favour of banning the export, transfer and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines.		yes	yes
Nepal ²⁷	Abstained	Nepal remains fully committed to the humanitarian objectives of the Convention.	The army wishes to retain the option to use landmines again to protect its defense posts in case of renewed insurgency. ²⁸	yes ²⁹	yes
Oman	In favour	The Sultanate of Oman shares wholeheartedly in the aims of the campaign for a total global ban. ³⁰	Both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oman have expressed the desire for a common position among the six gulf Cooperation Council states. ³¹	yes	

²⁵ Information transmitted by the Permanent Mission of Morocco (Geneva) to the ISU, 5 August 2009.

²⁶ Explanation of vote on the UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (Document A/C.1/61/L.A7. Rev1 October 2006)

²⁷ Statement by Nepal to the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention, Jordan, 18-22 November 2007.

²⁸ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1042.

²⁹ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1043.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Pakistan ³²	Abstained		Landmines play a significant role in the defence needs of States. Given the need to guard long borders, the use of landmines forms a part of Pakistan's defence strategy. The goal of their total elimination means making available cost-effective alternatives.	yes	

³⁰ Statement by Oman at the Signing Ceremony of the AP Mine Ban Convention, Ottawa, Canada, 2 December 1997.

³¹ Landmine Monitor Report 2007, 947.

³² Explanation of vote on the UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Poland ³³	In favour	Poland has taken all the necessary steps to accede to the Convention in the near term. On 6 February 2009 the Government of Poland adopted Information on the state of readiness of the Council of Ministers to bind the Republic of Poland by the Convention, where it assured of its commitment to ratify the Convention in 2012. This adoption is the first step in the ratification process that will be initiated formally in due course. For several years Poland has voluntarily implemented most of the Convention's provisions: we do not produce, export or use anti-personnel mines in military operations. Poland announced a moratorium on transfers of anti-personnel mines in 1995 which was prolonged indefinitely in 1998.	The reason for not acceding to the Convention so far was that Poland has not yet introduced to its armed forces viable solutions which would substitute anti-personnel mines.	yes	no
Russian Federation ³⁴	Abstained		Russia is against the creation of forums where ones already exist. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is the appropriate forum for the issue.	yes	yes

³³ Information transmitted by the Permanent Mission of Poland (Geneva) to the ISU, 20 July 2009.

³⁴ Explanation of vote on the UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Saudi Arabia ³⁵		Saudi Arabia supports the humanitarian objectives and respects the spirit of the Convention.	Saudi Arabia does not want to give up its option to use anti-personnel mines in the future.	yes ³⁶	
Singapore ³⁷	In favour	Singapore declared a moratorium on landmines in 1996 and further, in 1998, on other types of mines.	The right defence of any State could not be hampered, so perhaps a total ban would be counter-productive.	yes	
Somalia ³⁸	In favour	The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia intends to accede to the Convention.	Somalia states that the priority must remain on re-establishing the country.	yes ³⁹	
Sri Lanka ⁴⁰	In favour		Sri Lanka's accession is dependent upon progress in the peace process.	yes	
Syrian Arab Republic ⁴¹	Abstained	Syria has expressed concern for the plight of mine victims and support for risk education and other efforts to protect civilians.	Syria view anti-personnel mines as necessary weapons for national defence. It considers continued occupation of part of the Golan Heights as an important reason for not joining the Convention.		
Tonga ⁴²	In favour		Tonga states that it lacks the internal resources needed to complete the necessary accession procedures.	no	no

³⁵ Statement delivered by Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defence to the First Review Conference of the AP Mine Ban Convention, Nairobi, 3 December 2004.

³⁶ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1081.

³⁷ Explanation of vote on the UNGA First Committee resolution on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (document A/C.1/64/L.53), October 2009.

³⁸ Statement by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to the First Review Conference of the AP Mine Ban Convention, Nairobi, 3 December 2009.

³⁹ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1087.

⁴⁰ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1104.

⁴¹ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1122.

⁴² Remarks of Tonga made to the Regional Workshop Towards a Mine-Free Pacific, Prot Vila, Vanuatu, 3 May 2007.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Tuvalu ⁴³	In favour		Tuvalu states that its main obstacles to joining the Convention are limited manpower and financial resources to meeting other pressing needs on their budget.	no	no
United Arab Emirates ⁴⁴	In favour	We do not produce anti-personnel mines. We do not transfer anti-personnel mines to any party or any other country.	We believe that the question of acceding to the Convention still needs further study and consultations before taking any decision.	yes	
USA	Abstained	The United States shares the humanitarian concerns of parties to the Ottawa Convention.	The USA is carrying out “an ongoing comprehensive review of US landmine policy initiated at the direction of President Obama”. ⁴⁵	yes	
Uzbekistan ⁴⁶	Abstained		Uzbekistan has stated that mines are necessary for national security to prevent the flow of narcotics, arms and insurgent groups across its borders.	yes	

⁴³ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1128.

⁴⁴ Information transmitted by the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates (Geneva) to the ISU, 25 September 2009.

⁴⁵ Statement delivered by the United States of America at the second Review Conference of the Convention, 1 December 2009.

⁴⁶ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1139.

State not party	Most recent UNGA vote on the Convention	Stated support for aims of the Convention	Stated reason for not acceding to the Convention	Stockpiles anti-personnel mines	New emplacements of mines since 2004
Vietnam ⁴⁷	Abstained	We therefore have joined the world community to welcome the various bans, moratoria and other restrictions already declared by States on anti-personnel landmines as well as the growing consensus against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines against civilians...We support the humanitarian aspects of the Convention.	Vietnam has stated that it cannot sign the Convention yet as it does not duly take into account the legitimate security concerns of many countries including Vietnam.	yes ⁴⁸	

⁴⁷ Statement delivered by Vietnam to the Meeting of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, 2 June 2008.

⁴⁸ Landmine Monitor Report 2009, 1143.

Table 2: Voting record of States not parties on the annual UNGA resolution in support of the Convention

State not party	2004 UNGA 69/84	2005 UNGA 60/80	2006 UNGA 61/84	2007 UNGA 62/41	2008 UNGA 63/42
Armenia	In favour				
Azerbaijan	Abstained	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
Bahrain	In favour				
China	Abstained	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
Cuba	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Democratic People's Republic of Korea				Abstained	Abstained
Egypt	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Finland	In favour				
Georgia	In favour				
India	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Iran	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Israel	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Kazakhstan	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	In favour	In favour
Kyrgyzstan	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Lao People's Democratic Republic				In favour	In favour
Lebanon	Abstained		Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Marshall Islands	Abstained	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Abstained	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
Mongolia	In favour	Absent	In favour	In favour	In favour
Morocco	In favour				
Myanmar	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Nepal		In favour		Abstained	Abstained
Oman	In favour				
Pakistan	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Poland	In favour				
Republic of Korea	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Russian Federation	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Saudi Arabia					
Singapore	In favour				
Somalia	In favour	In favour		In favour	
Sri Lanka	In favour				
Syrian Arab Republic	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained

State not party	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	UNGA 69/84	UNGA 60/80	UNGA 61/84	UNGA 62/41	UNGA 63/42
Tonga	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour	
Tuvalu	In favour	In favour			In favour
United Arab Emirates	In favour				
United States of America	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Uzbekistan	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained
Viet Nam	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained	Abstained

Annex III

Stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed and waiting to be destroyed

Table 1: Stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed by the States Parties

State Party	Up to 2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Afghanistan			486'226				486'226
Albania	1'683'860						1'683'860
Algeria	3'030	144'020					147'050
Angola			81'045				81'045
Argentina	99'968						99'968
Australia	134'621						134'621
Austria	116'000						116'000
Bangladesh		189'227					189'227
Belarus	253'658		298'375				552'033
Belgium	435'238						435'238
Bosnia and Herzegovina*	461'634			14'073			475'707
Brazil	27'852						27'852
Bulgaria	890'209			12			890'221
Burundi					664		664
Cambodia	105'539			98'132			203'671
Cameroon	500						500
Canada	92'551						92'551
Cape Verde			1'516				1'516
Chad	5'727	1'158					6'885
Chile	299'219						299'219

Colombia	19'026					19'026
Congo	5'136				4'000	9'136
Croatia	199'271					199'271
Cyprus	4'368	11'000	18'154	15'394		48'916
Czech Republic	324'412					324'412
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1'623	2'864				4'487
Denmark	269'351					269'351
Djibouti	1'188					1'188
Ecuador	262'272			1'001		263'273
El Salvador	7'549					7'549
Ethiopia				5'859	54'455	60'314
France	1'098'485					1'098'485
Gabon	1'082					1'082
Germany	1'700'000					1'700'000
Greece					225'692	225'692
Guinea	3'174					3'174
Guinea Bissau	5'711	5'943				11'654
Honduras	7'441					7'441
Hungary	356'884					356'884
Indonesia				12'312		12'312
Italy	7'112'811					7'112'811
Kuwait				91'432		91'432
Japan	1'000'089					1'000'089
Jordan	92'342					92'342

Kenya	35'774						35'774
Lithuania	4'104						4'104
Luxembourg	9'522						9'522
Malaysia	94'721						94'721
Mali	5'627						5'627
Mauritania	26'053						26'053
Mauritius	93						93
Mozambique	37'818						37'818
Namibia	4'936						4'936
Netherlands	260'510						260'510
Nicaragua	133'435						133'435
Niger	113				1'772		1'885
Norway	160'000						160'000
Peru	338'356						338'356
Portugal	271'967						271'967
Republic of Moldova	12'892						12'892
Romania	1'075'074						1'075'074
Serbia				1'404'819			1'404'819
Sierra Leone	956						956
Slovakia	185'579						185'579
Slovenia	168'899						168'899
South Africa	312'089						312'089
Spain	849'365						849'365
Sudan				4'488	6'078		10'566
Suriname	146						146
Sweden	2'663'149						2'663'149

Switzerland	3'850'212						3'850'212
Tajikistan	3'029						3'029
Tanzania	22'841						22'841
Thailand	335'848						335'848
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	38'921						38'921
Tunisia	17'575						17'575
Turkey			94'111	250'048	913'788		1'257'947
Turkmenistan	6'631'771						6'631'771
Uganda	6'383				120		6'503
Ukraine	756'216						756'216
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2'401'324						2'401'324
Uruguay	1'811						1'811
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	47'189						47'189
Yemen	78'000						78'000
Zambia	3'345						3'345
Zimbabwe	4'092						4'092
Total	37'931'556	354'212	979'427	1'793'826	1'026'166	284'147	42'369'334

* Until 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported a total of 460,925 anti-personnel mines destroyed in its Article 7 report and in 2005 it indicated that 461,634 anti-personnel mines had been destroyed.

Table 2: Stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported by the States Parties that remain to be destroyed

State Party	Mines to be destroyed⁴⁹
Belarus	3'371'984
Greece	1'340'570
Turkey	956,761
Ukraine	6'099'468
Total	11'768'783

⁴⁹ Sources: Article 7 reports submitted in 2009, statements made by the States Parties during the May 2009 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction and other information furnished by States Parties.

Annex IV

Suggested outline for preparing Article 5 extension requests

I. Executive Summary

- This could be 2-5 pages long, summarising the essential details required in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 4 and containing any other essential information which the requesting State Party would want to quickly and efficiently communicate.

II. Detailed Narrative

1. Origins of the Article 5 implementation challenge
2. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects
3. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects
4. Methods used to identify areas containing AP mines and reasons for suspecting the presence of AP mines in other areas
5. National demining structures
6. Nature and extent of progress made: quantitative aspects
7. Nature and extent of progress made: qualitative aspects
8. Methods & standards used to release areas known or suspected to contain AP mines
9. Methods & standards of controlling and assuring quality
10. Efforts undertaken to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas
11. Resources made available to support progress made to date
12. Circumstances that impede compliance in a 10 year period
13. Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications
14. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects
15. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects
16. Amount of time requested and a rationale for this amount of time
17. Detailed work plan for the period of the requested extension
 - If necessary, what survey activities will take place when to determine the actual location, size and other characteristics of mined areas?
 - How much will be released during each year of the extension period? (e.g., How much area? How many areas? Which areas? How will priorities be established?)
 - What demining, survey and other land release methods and what standards applied?
 - What is the annual cost and for what?
 - What are the expected sources of funding / other resources to implement the plan?
 - What assumptions are made regarding the realisation of the plan?
 - What are potential risk factors that may affect realisation of the plan?
18. Institutional, human resource and material capacity
 - What is available?
 - What institutions / structures will be established, and what changes to existing ones will be made, to realise the plan?

III: Annexes

- Map(s)
- List of abbreviations / acronyms
- Glossary
- Tables, possibly modified or replicated from the voluntary template adopted in November 2007, for example, listing all mined areas as well as their size, location, status and other characteristics.

Other considerations:

- Include a cover page containing the date of the document.
- Include contact information for an individual who can answer questions about the information contained in the extension request.

Annex V**Progress in the implementation of Article 5**

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Afghanistan	In 2004, Afghanistan estimated that there were approximately 788.7 square kilometres of land contaminated by mines and / or UXO in 206 districts of 31 provinces.	In 2009, Afghanistan reported that 234.89 square kilometres of areas containing mines and 394.07 square kilometres of areas suspected to contain mines remained.	
Algeria	In 2005, Algeria reported that 56.76 square kilometres containing 3,064,180 anti-personnel mines.	In 2009, Algeria reported that 36.12 square kilometres had been cleared and handed over and that 379,243 mines had been destroyed.	
Angola	The report of the Landmine Impact Survey which was completed in Angola in 2007 identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas totalling approximately 1,239 square kilometres.	In 2008, Angola reported that 895,586,695 square metres remained to be addressed.	
Argentina	In its extension request, Argentina reported 9 areas containing mines divided in 117 minefields amounting to 13.12 square kilometres.	In its extension request, Argentina reported that the 9 areas containing mines divided in 117 minefields amounting to 13.12 square kilometres remained.	In its extension request, Argentina reported that it has a “schematic plan” to clear the 117 minefields by 1 March 2020.

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Bhutan	In 2007, Bhutan reported 50 MNM-14 anti-personnel mines and 12 M-16 anti-personnel mines that were laid on the track in an area called Gobarkunda and that 41 M-16 anti-personnel mines were laid on five tracks leading to the camps in Nganglam Sub-District.		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	In 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported approximately 2,000 square kilometres suspected to contain mines.	In 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported 1,573 square kilometres suspected to contain mines.	In its extension request, Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 March 2009
Burundi	Burundi has indicated that its original challenge amounted to 234 suspected areas.	In 2009, Burundi reported that of the original 234 areas, 2 areas remain to be cleared and 58 additional areas have been identified.	
Cambodia	A Level One Survey completed in 2002 identified 4,544 square kilometres of suspected hazardous area.	In its extension request, Cambodia projects that 648.8 square kilometres remain mine affected and will need to be addressed.	In its extension request, Cambodia has indicated that a 38 percent increase in financial resources will be necessary to complete implementation by 1 January 2020.

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Chad	In 2004, Chad reported 417 areas suspected to contain mines totalling 1,081 square kilometres.	In 2009, Chad reported areas suspected to contain mines totalling 678 square kilometres.	In its extension request, Chad indicated that it would resubmit a request to the States Parties in 2010 in which it would detail, with greater precision, the remaining implementation challenge and a time frame for addressing it.
Chile	In 2004, Chile reported 114,830 emplaced mines in 208 minefields located in 26 areas.	In 2009, Chile reported that 164 minefields remain to be cleared.	Chile has established a humanitarian demining plan for 2008-2016, which, however, does not imply that 2016 is the end date for implementation.
Colombia	In 2008, Colombia has reported 34 minefields around military bases and an additional 8,137 areas that have been recorded as dangerous.	In 2009, Colombia reported that 22 of the 34 minefields around military bases had been cleared.	In 2009, Colombia reported that it would complete clearance of minefields around its military bases by 1 March 2011 and that it would submit an extension request in 2010 to address other remaining dangerous areas.
Congo	In 2004, Congo reported that areas in the south-west of the country might be mined.	In 2009, Congo reported one area suspected to be mined along its border with Angola.	
Croatia	In 2004, Croatia reported that an estimated 1,350 square kilometres were suspected to contain mines, with mines found in 14 of the 21 counties of Croatia.	In 2009, Croatia reported that 954.5 square kilometres suspected to contain mines remain.	In its extension request, Croatia indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 March 2019.

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Cyprus	In 2004, Cyprus reported 23 minefields containing 5,000 anti-personnel mines.	In 2009, Cyprus reported 10 minefields containing 3,224 anti-personnel mines.	Cyprus's national plan foresees completion by 1 July 2013.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	In 2004, the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that suspected mined areas affect 165 villages in 11 provinces.		
Denmark	In its extension request, Denmark reported that its original implementation challenge amounted to 128 mined areas totalling 2,950,000 square metres.	In 2009, Denmark reported that 1,246,000 square metres remain to be addressed.	In its extension request, Denmark indicated that it would resubmit a request to the States Parties in 2010 in which it would detail, with greater precision, the remaining implementation challenge and a time frame for addressing it.
Ecuador	In its extension request, Ecuador reported that its original implementation challenge amounted to 128 mined areas totalling 621,034.50 square metres.	In 2009, Ecuador reported that 76 mined areas covering 594,312.46 square metres remained.	In its extension request, submitted in 2008, Ecuador indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 September 2017.
Eritrea	The report of the Landmine Impact Survey which was completed in Eritrea in 2004 indicated that there were 752 areas suspected to contain mines.	In 2009, Eritrea reported 702 mined areas pending technical survey.	

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Ethiopia	The report of the Landmine Impact Survey which was completed in Ethiopia in 2004 indicated that there were 1,916 suspect hazard areas.	In 2009, Ethiopia reported 190 areas remaining, including 164 confirmed and 48 suspected to contain mines.	
Gambia	The Gambia has been affected by the conflict situation in the Southern Casamance region of Senegal. In 2007, there were mine incidents which claimed the lives of two small boys from a border village.		
Guinea Bissau	In 2004, Guinea Bissau reported 17 suspected minefields in Bissau and its surroundings and that other suspected areas exist in the east and in the northern region bordering Senegal.	In 2009, Guinea Bissau reported that 12 minefields with a total area of 2,236,560 square metres remain.	
Iraq	The report of the Landmine Impact Survey which was completed in Iraq in 2006 recorded 3,673 suspected hazardous areas totalling 1,730 square kilometres.		

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Jordan	In 2004, Jordan reported that its original mine clearance challenge going back to 1993 included 60 million square metres of mined area containing approximately 309,000 emplaced mines.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Jordan indicated that approximately 10 million square metres containing close to 136,000 landmines remained to be addressed.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Jordan indicated that it would complete implementation by 1 May 2012.
Mauritania	The report of the Landmine Impact Survey which was completed in Mauritania in 2006 indicated that there were 88 square kilometres of contaminated area.	In 2009, Mauritania reported that there 15 square kilometres remained to be addressed.	In 2009, Mauritania indicated that it would submit a request for an extension in 2010.
Mozambique	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Mozambique indicated that at Landmine Impact Survey concluded in 2001 recorded 1,374 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines totalling 561.69 square kilometres.	In 2009, Mozambique reported that 361 mined areas totalling 10,489,453 square metres remained.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Mozambique indicated that it would complete implementation by 1 March 2014.
Nicaragua	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Nicaragua reported that its original implementation challenge totalled 1,005 “targets”.	In 2009, Nicaragua reported that 10 targets remain.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Nicaragua indicated that it would complete implementation by 1 May 2010.

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Nigeria	Nigeria reported areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines in the eastern part of the country.		Nigeria indicated that it was taking steps to proceed with a technical assessment to determine if there were indeed anti-personnel mines in the suspected areas. If the presence of anti-personnel mines is confirmed by the assessment, Nigeria will act in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1.

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Peru	<p>In its extension request submitted in 2008, Peru indicated that its original implementation challenge included 2,518 areas totalling 1,811,736 square metres around high tension electrical towers, 3 areas totalling 11,167 square meters around maximum security prisons, 2 police bases suspected of containing mines with an unknown total area, a thermo electrical power plant with a total area of 13,000 square metres, 3 transmission antennas and 1 substation with an unknown total affected area, and, 69 areas suspected of containing anti-personnel mines totalling 512,329.50 square meters along Peru's border with Ecuador.</p>	<p>In its extension request submitted in 2008, Peru indicated that 393 infrastructure sites remained to be addressed totalling 172,567 square metres including 384 towers, 3 transmission antennas, 1 electrical substation, 3 maximum security prisons and 2 police bases. In addition, 35 sites along Peru's border with Ecuador remained totalling approximately 189,665.52 square meters.</p>	<p>In its extension request submitted in 2008, Peru indicated that it would complete implementation by 1 March 2017.</p>

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Senegal	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Senegal indicated that its original implementation challenge amounted to 149 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Senegal indicated that 147 suspected hazardous areas remained, including 83 areas (approximately 11,175,359 square metres), 47 areas (73.45 linear kilometres of roads or paths) and 17 areas, the estimated size of which is unknown.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Senegal indicated that it would complete implementation by 1 March 2016.
Serbia	In 2004, Serbia reported that its implementation challenge amounted to approximately 6,000,000 square metres of suspected hazardous area.	In 2009, Serbia reported that 5 projects totalling approximately 973,420 square metres remain to be addressed.	In 2009, Serbia indicated that it would complete implementation by the end of the year.
Sudan	In 2009, Sudan reported that its original implementation challenge amounted to 4,475 dangerous areas.	In 2009, Sudan reported that 1,665 dangerous areas remain to be addressed.	
Tajikistan	In its extension request submitted in 2009, Tajikistan indicated that its original implementation challenge amounted to 50,668,272 square metres.	In its extension request submitted in 2009, Tajikistan indicated as of December 2008, a total of 14,849,631 square metres remained to be addressed.	In its extension request submitted in 2009, Tajikistan indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 April 2020.

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Thailand	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Thailand indicated that its original implementation challenge amounted to 934 suspected areas totalling 2,556.7 square kilometres.	In 2009, Thailand reported that the estimated amount of mined area remaining totalled 547.9 square kilometres.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Thailand indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 November 2018.
Turkey	In 2005, Turkey reported 919,855 emplaced anti-personnel mines.	In 2008, Turkey reported that 817,397 emplaced anti-personnel mines remain.	In 2009, Turkey indicated that it would spare no effort to meet its 1 March 2014 deadline
Uganda	In its extension request submitted in 2009, Uganda indicated that its original challenge amounted to 427 suspected hazardous areas.	In its extension request submitted in 2009, Uganda indicated that one of the 427 originally identified areas remained as did one additional area for a total of 270,000 square metres.	In its extension request submitted in 2009, Uganda indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 August 2012.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	In its extension request submitted in 2008, the United Kingdom reported that its original challenge amounted to 117 mined areas (including 4 areas that are only suspected of containing mines) totalling over 13 square kilometres.	In 2009, the United Kingdom reported that the original 117 areas remained with efforts underway which would result in clearance starting in three areas.	In 2008, the United Kingdom was granted an extension until 1 March 2019.

State Party	Areas in which anti-personnel were known or were suspected to be emplaced	Areas in which anti-personnel are known or are suspected to be emplaced	Plan/timeframe for completion of implementation
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	In 2004, Venezuela reported that its implementation challenge amounted to 13 minefields distributed in 6 naval posts, containing with 1,073 mines.	In 2009, Venezuela reported that the original 13 minefields distributed in 6 naval posts remained.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Venezuela indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 October 2014.
Yemen	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Yemen indicated that a total of 1,088 areas amounting to 923,332,281 square metres were originally of concern.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Yemen indicated that 213,228,351 square metres remained to be released.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Yemen indicated that it would complete implementation of Article 5 by 1 March 2015.
Zimbabwe	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Zimbabwe reported that its original challenge amounted to 1,119 square kilometres of mined area.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Zimbabwe reported that 813.3 square kilometres of contaminated land remained.	In its extension request submitted in 2008, Zimbabwe indicated that it would resubmit a request to the States Parties in 2010 in which it would detail, with greater precision, the remaining implementation challenge and a time frame for addressing it.

Annex VII

Numbers of new mine casualties 2004-2008¹

State Party	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Afghanistan	911	1'122	906	781	831	4'551
Albania	25	2	0	0	0	27
Algeria						
Angola						
Argentina	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bhutan						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	48	51	50	48	63	260
Burundi						
Cambodia	898	875	450	352	269	2'844
Chad			140	188	114	442
Chile						
Colombia	277	371	381	217	273	1'519
Congo, Republic of						
Croatia	16	13	10	8	7	54
Cyprus						
DRC	63	60	41	28	11	203
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	3	0	0	0	0	3
Eritrea						
Ethiopia						
Greece						
Guinea Bissau		16	37	5	1	59
Iraq*	201	73	27	60	73	434
Jordan	5	5	0	2	8	20
Mauritania						
Mozambique	30	57	30	24		141
Nicaragua	7	14	6	12	2	41
Nigeria						
Peru	0	3	2	5	0	10
Rwanda	11	10	12	9	7	49
Senegal	17	10	13	1	1	42
Serbia						
Sudan		116	140	88	63	407
Tajikistan	19	20	21	20	13	93
Thailand	23	18	16	12	5	74
Tunisia						
Turkey						
Uganda			62	4	17	83
United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	
Venezuela						
Yemen	18	23	18	23		82
Zambia						
Zimbabwe		12	5	8	3	28
Total	2'572	2'871	2'367	1'895	1'761	11'466

* Figures for Iraq only include the northern part of the country.

¹ This table contains a list of those States Parties which, in 2009, were still in the process of implementing Article 5 of the Convention and the number of new civilian landmine casualties reported by each from 2004 to 2008. Numbers reported may include individuals killed or injured by explosive remnants of war other than anti-personnel mines.

Annex VIII

Resources in support of the aims of the Convention

Table 1: International resources generated in support of national efforts to implement Article 5, 2004-2008, by beneficiary State (in US\$)

State	2'004	2'005	2'006	2'007	2'008	Total
Afghanistan	47'135'825	67'669'870	57'452'066	81'660'161	88'971'619	342'889'541
Albania	4'839'093	7'430'342	4'889'543	2'969'916	5'696'425	25'825'319
Algeria		128'346	253'546	740'548	0	1'122'440
Angola	24'052'789	32'698'179	46'441'404	19'780'794	21'324'622	144'297'788
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12'083'552	19'422'097	21'703'872	23'306'858	32'713'775	109'230'153
Burundi	974'182	1'252'500	2'978'822	1'057'671	1'094'632	7'357'807
Cambodia	41'700'000	25'600'000	29'600'000	30'800'000	24'879'466	152'579'466
Chad	1'720'138	2'891'959	2'936'567	625'686	469'070	8'643'420
Chile	236'035	416'982	4'152'285	4'330'549	4'042'492	13'178'343
Colombia	3'718'930	1'129'914	1'156'662	8'381'039	2'367'032	16'753'577
Congo, Republic of					0	0
Croatia	9'775'900	11'253'974	8'316'449	6'832'279	6'298'304	42'476'905
Cyprus	3'600'000	5'000'000	1'260'000	5'484'400	0	15'344'400
DRC	6'119	4'030'783	4'421'068	5'909'017	12'407'357	26'774'344
Ecuador	881'942	311'632	632'668	326'836		2'153'078
Eritrea	16'085'331	4'853'714	690'630		338'698	21'968'373
Ethiopia	2'658'900	2'496'557	7'434'540	5'655'048	8'312'500	26'557'545
Guinea Bissau	898'902	992'289	888'747	4'652'635	1'694'882	9'127'455
Iraq	56'794'344	24'260'063	23'996'756	25'705'404	26'592'974	157'349'541
Jordan	943'000	1'985'764	5'578'837	5'654'478	7'096'618	21'258'697
Mauritania	390'000	116'000	711'000	658'000	200'000	2'075'000
Mozambique	14'400'000	15'000'000	6'200'000	2'700'000		38'300'000
Nicaragua	5'000'000	5'000'000	5'000'000	5'500'000		20'500'000
Peru	559'305		495'321	234'230	812'422	2'101'278
Rwanda	11'439		476'000		441'780	929'219
Senegal	396'244	600'952	749'657	6'788'027		8'534'880
Serbia	1'191'118	1'450'351	2'014'257	1'719'039	2'031'529	8'406'294
Sudan	17'120'609	61'165'836	29'981'082	28'877'327	38'341'507	175'486'361
Tajikistan	1'997'182	1'220'112	2'547'782	1'378'221	2'134'794	9'278'091
Thailand	750'000	900'000	862'817	806'794	1'040'957	4'360'568
Uganda		702'427	1'525'918	2'123'516	823'916	5'175'778
Yemen	3'401'640	1'844'000	2'068'820	1'884'806	1'331'000	10'530'266
Zambia		83'366	250'000	529'850		863'216
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	273'322'519	301'908'009	277'667'115	287'073'129	291'458'372	1'431'429'143

Table 2: International resources generated in support of national efforts to implement Article 5, 2004-2008, by contributing State²

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Donor Funding	\$399'000'000	\$376'000'000	\$475'000'000	\$430'000'000	\$517'800'000	\$2'197'800'000

Table 3: Beneficiaries of funds that have flowed through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, 2004-2008³

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Totals
Afghanistan	\$28'844'086	\$29'331'113	\$29'709'234	\$23'710'165	\$69'924'486	\$181'519'084
Angola	\$648'999	\$94'202	\$1'706			\$744'907
Bosnia and Herzegovina		\$376'199				\$376'199
Burundi	\$24'999	\$125'990	\$864'029	\$58'358		\$1'073'376
Cambodia		\$149'877	\$65'619	\$53'812	\$299'443	\$568'751
Chad		\$400'000			\$284'305	\$684'305
Croatia		\$85'094				\$85'094
DRC	\$723'848	\$743'022	\$1'395'257	\$928'626	\$1'659'487	\$5'450'240
Eritrea & Ethiopia	\$506'031	\$1'348'980	\$114'101	\$497'094	\$202'173	\$2'668'379
Iraq					\$60'593	\$60'593
Macedonia, FYR of		\$78'016				\$78'016
Mozambique		\$506'277				\$506'277
Nicaragua		\$152'142				\$152'142
Serbia					269'773	\$269'773
Sudan	\$7'657'468	\$17'404'410	\$9'994'736	\$17'428'680	\$13'911'688	\$66'396'982
Uganda			\$6'361		\$6'763	\$13'124
Yemen		\$423'413				\$423'413
Zambia					\$76'937	\$76'937
States / entities not parties	\$4'377'311	\$12'084'417	\$8'912'179	\$16'155'852	\$18'472'204	\$60'001'963
Headquarters / core	\$3'290'535	\$3'800'639	\$3'607'974	\$4'210'306	\$4'028'733	\$18'938'187
Other activities	\$479'586	\$1'275'375	\$861'127	\$561'066	\$565'658	\$3'742'812
Totals	\$46'552'863	\$68'379'166	\$55'532'323	\$63'603'959	\$109'762'243	\$343'830'554

² Source: ICBL Landmine Monitor annual reports, not adjusted for inflation.

³ Source: Year-specific expenditures contained in UNMAS annual reports, not adjusted for inflation.

Table 4: Beneficiaries of funds that have flowed for mine action through the UNDP's Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund, 2004-2008⁴

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Totals
Afghanistan	\$12'933'505	\$15'716'231	\$7'532'381	\$1'605'766	\$50'000	\$37'837'883
Albania	\$78'904	\$318'169	\$189'952	\$200'155	\$852'001	\$1'639'181
Algeria				\$247'603	\$57'150	\$304'753
Angola	\$4'102'162	\$669'834	\$564'464	\$101'874		\$5'438'334
Bangladesh	\$146'200	\$98'568				\$244'768
Belarus			\$7'598			\$7'598
Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$838'196	\$1'119'749	\$924'317	\$653'066	\$539'529	\$4'074'857
Burundi			\$294'762	\$349'546	\$224'657	\$868'965
Cambodia	\$500'157	\$224'873	\$95'238			\$820'268
Chad	\$308'650	\$232'008		\$321'840	\$1'241'670	\$2'104'168
Colombia	\$40'677	\$80'888	\$47'158			\$168'723
Croatia				\$19'048	\$7'685	\$26'733
Eritrea	\$320'042	\$293'376		\$58'975		\$672'393
Ethiopia	\$403'839	\$349'457	\$1'126'455	\$722'000	\$647'699	\$3'249'450
Guinea Bissau	\$1'691	\$342'436	\$196'029	\$441'782	\$340'742	\$1'322'680
Iraq				\$1'604'076	\$2'041'582	\$3'645'658
Jordan	\$146'786	\$279'423	\$990'429	\$400'129	\$328'550	\$2'145'317
Malawi				\$150'000	\$3'798	\$153'798
Mauritania	\$20'915		\$200'568	\$107'807	\$18'759	\$348'049
Mozambique	\$781'995		\$207'137		\$25'643	\$1'014'775
Senegal		\$99'056	\$238'071	\$508'194	\$237'529	\$1'082'850
Sudan	\$267'767	\$235'734	\$963'283	\$2'339'259	\$1'647'279	\$5'453'322
Tajikistan	\$342'518	\$299'462	\$778'209	\$416'878	\$593'267	\$2'430'334
Thailand	\$6'905	\$208				\$7'113
Uganda		\$170'623	\$725'512	\$602'264	\$426'438	\$1'924'837
Yemen	\$1'104'426	\$588'307	\$692'017	\$696'686	\$383'893	\$3'465'329
Zambia				\$351'742	\$257'589	\$609'331
Zimbabwe				\$150'000	\$66'148	\$216'148
States / entities not parties	\$2'805'486	\$3'954'964	\$4'243'273	\$2'256'912	\$2'937'609	\$16'198'244
Global	\$3'014'641	\$2'124'032	\$1'478'136	\$3'708'625	\$4'383'186	\$14'708'620
Totals	\$28'165'462	\$27'197'398	\$21'494'989	\$18'014'227	\$17'312'403	\$112'184'479

⁴ Source: UNDP, not adjusted for inflation.

Table 5: Beneficiaries of funds for mine action from UN Peacekeeping Assessed Funds, 2004-2008⁵

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Totals
Chad					2'303'112.00	2'303'112.00
Burundi	329'076.00	1'421'373.00				1'750'449.00
DRC	\$3'712'302	\$2'825'185	\$3'563'844	\$3'250'863	\$3'392'606	\$16'744'800
Eritrea & Ethiopia	\$4'440'759	\$7'073'346	\$5'169'478	\$6'764'375	\$6'178'804	\$29'626'762
Sudan	\$1'821'778	\$13'210'878	\$17'638'566	\$38'575'911	\$53'015'347	\$124'262'480
States / entities not parties	\$449'123	\$635'869	\$595'416	\$2'296'381	\$2'505'526	\$6'482'315
Totals	\$10'753'038	\$25'166'651	\$26'967'304	\$50'887'530	\$67'395'395	\$181'169'918

Table 6: Funds generated by leading actors for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities and for the advancement and guarantee of their rights, 2004 to 2008⁶

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
HI - Belgium	\$9'637'761.36	\$9'583'428.29	\$8'181'998.72	\$9'220'732.17	\$12'059'344.89	\$48'683'265.43
HI - France	\$2'599'772.10	\$2'745'777.58	\$6'812'928.72	\$6'625'429.42		\$18'783'907.82
HI - Luxembourg	\$863'473.29	\$676'685.19	\$682'881.84	\$1'006'388.04	\$972'988.74	\$4'202'417.10
HI - Switzerland	\$2'498'391.08	\$2'366'514.93	\$3'298'177.85	\$4'944'751.46	\$5'944'583.95	\$19'052'419.27
ICRC Special Appeal	\$12'708'068.07	\$15'803'836.58	\$14'291'413.98	\$19'893'324.44	\$23'557'692.31	\$86'254'335.38
ICRC Special Fund	\$3'369'000.00	\$4'037'000.00	\$4'352'000.00	\$5'227'338.00	\$4'798'813.00	\$21'784'151.00
LSN / Survivor Corps	\$6'605'723.00	\$7'052'771.00	\$7'414'963.00	\$6'972'685.00	\$5'938'355.00	\$33'984'497.00
Totals	\$38'282'188.90	\$42'266'013.57	\$45'034'364.11	\$53'890'648.53	\$53'271'777.89	\$232'744'993.00

⁵ Source: UNMAS annual reports, not adjusted for inflation.

⁶ Source: Reports provided by or made available by each actor. Note that figures for 2008 for HI France were unable. Note that figures for HI Luxembourg and LSN / Survivor Corps may include expenditures on other matters. Figures have not been adjusted for inflation.

Annex IX**Transparency reports submitted 2005-2009**

State Party	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Afghanistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Albania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Andorra	N	N	N	N	Y
Angola	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Antigua and Barbuda	N	N	N	N	N
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Australia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Austria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bahamas	Y	N	N	N	Y
Bangladesh	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados	N	N	N	N	N
Belarus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belgium	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belize	Y	Y	N	N	N
Benin	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Bhutan		N	Y	N	N
Bolivia	Y	Y	N	N	N
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Botswana	N	N	N	N	N
Brazil	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brunei Darussalam			Y	N	N
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burkina Faso	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Burundi	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Cambodia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cameroon	Y	N	N	N	Y
Canada	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cape Verde	N	N	N	N	Y
Central African Republic	N	N	N	N	N
Chad	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Colombia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoros	N	N	N	N	N
Congo	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Cook Islands			Y	N	N
Costa Rica	Y	N	N	N	N
Côte d'Ivoire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Croatia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

State Party	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czech Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Denmark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Djibouti	Y	N	N	N	N
Dominica	Y	N	N	Y	N
Dominican Republic	N	N	N	N	Y
Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Equatorial Guinea	N	N	N	N	N
Eritrea	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Estonia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia	N	N	N	Y	Y
Fiji	N	N	N	N	N
France	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gabon	N	N	N	N	N
Gambia	N	N	N	N	Y
Germany	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ghana	N	N	N	N	N
Greece	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Grenada	N	N	N	N	N
Guatemala	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Guinea	N	N	N	N	N
Guinea Bissau	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Guyana	N	Y	N	N	N
Haiti			N	N	Y
Holy See	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Honduras	N	Y	Y	N	N
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iceland	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Indonesia				Y	Y
Iraq				Y	Y
Ireland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Italy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamaica	Y	N	Y	N	N
Japan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kenya	N	Y	N	Y	N
Kiribati	N	N	N	N	N
Kuwait				Y	Y
Latvia		Y	Y	Y	Y
Lesotho	N	Y	N	N	N
Liberia	N	N	N	N	N

State Party	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Liechtenstein	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lithuania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Luxembourg	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Madagascar	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Malawi	Y	N	N	N	Y
Malaysia	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Maldives	N	Y	N	N	N
Mali	Y	N	N	N	N
Malta	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Mauritania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Mexico	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Monaco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Montenegro			Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
Namibia	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Nauru	N	N	N	N	N
Netherlands	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
New Zealand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nicaragua	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Niger	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Nigeria	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Niue	N	N	Y	N	N
Norway	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Palau				Y	Y
Panama	N	N	N	N	Y
Papua New Guinea	N	N	N	N	N
Paraguay	N	Y	Y	N	N
Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Portugal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Qatar	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Republic of Moldova	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Romania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Saint Kitts and Nevis	N	N	N	N	N
Saint Lucia	N	N	N	N	N
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	N	N	N	N	N
Samoa	N	N	Y	Y	N
San Marino	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Sao Tome and Principe	N	N	Y	N	N
Senegal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Serbia	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

State Party	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Seychelles	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Sierra Leone	N	N	N	N	N
Slovakia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Slovenia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Solomon islands	N	N	N	N	N
South Africa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Spain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Suriname	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Swaziland	N	Y	N	N	N
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switzerland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tajikistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thailand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Timor-Leste	N	N	N	N	N
Togo	N	N	N	N	N
Trinidad and Tobago	N	Y	N	N	Y
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkmenistan	Y	Y	N	N	N
Uganda	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Ukraine	////	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	N	N	N	Y	N
Vanuatu	////	Y	N	Y	N
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zimbabwe	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Annex X

Mines retained for purposes permitted by Article 3 of the Convention

Table 1: Anti-personnel mines reported retained by the States Parties for reasons permitted under Article 3 of the Convention

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Afghanistan ¹							1076	1887	2692	2680	2618
Albania				0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Algeria					15030		15030	15030	15030	15030	6000
Andorra		0									
Angola						1390	1390	1460	2512		
Antigua and Barbuda		0									
Argentina ²		3049	13025	2160	1000	1772	1680	1596	1471	1380	1268
Australia	~10000	~10000	7845	7726	7513	7465	7395	7266	7133	6998	6785
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Bahamas				0		0	0				0
Bangladesh				15000	15000	15000	15000	14999	12500	12500	12500
Barbados					0						
Belarus						7530	6030	6030	6030	6030	6030
Belgium	5980	5816	5433	5099	4806	4443	4176	3820	3569	3287	3245

¹In its reports submitted in 2003 and 2004, Afghanistan indicated that a decision on the number of mines to retain was pending. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2004, Afghanistan indicated that it currently retained 370 inert mines. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2005, Afghanistan indicated that the Government had yet to develop a formal policy on the number of mines retained for development and training purposes. The Government on a case-by-case basis approves the number and type of APMs retained by UNMACA on behalf of the MAPA.

²In its report submitted in 2000, Argentina indicated that an additional number of mines to be retained by the Army was under consideration at that time. In its report submitted in 2002, Argentina indicated that 1160 mines were retained to be used as fuses for antitank mines FMK-5 and that 1000 will be consumed during training activities until 1 April 2010. Additionally, in Form F, Argentina indicated that 12025 mines would be emptied of their explosive content in order to have inert mines for training.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Belize	0					0					
Benin	0	0		0		0		30	16	16	
Bhutan									4491		
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0						0				
Bosnia and Herzegovina ³		2165	2405	2405	2525	2652	2755	17471	1708	1920	2390
Botswana ⁴											
Brazil ⁵		17000	16550	16545	16545	16545	16125	15038	13550	12381	10986
Brunei Darussalam ⁶									0		
Bulgaria	10446	4000	4000	3963	3963	3688	3676	3676	3670	3682	3682
Burkina Faso ⁷		0									
Burundi ⁸										4	4
Cambodia		0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Cameroon ⁹			500				3154				1885

³ In its reports submitted in 2001 and 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that 222 of the mines reported under Article 3 were fuse-less. In 2003, it indicated that 293 of the mines reported under Article 3 were fuse-less and in 2004, it indicated that 439 of the mines reported under Article 3 were fuse-less. In its report submitted in 2005, it indicated that 433 of the mines reported under Article 3 were fuse-less and also that the total of Article 3 mines was higher because it included the mines kept by demining companies, which hadn't been previously reported.

⁴ In its report submitted in 2001, Botswana indicated that a "small quantity" of mines would be retained.

⁵ In its report submitted in 2001, Brazil indicated that all mines retained would be destroyed in training activities during a period of 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention for Brazil, that is by October 2009. In its report submitted in 2006, Brazil indicated that it intends to keep its Article 3 mines up to 2019.

⁶ In its report submitted in 2007, Brunei Darussalam indicated that there were no live anti-personnel mines prohibited by the Convention retained for the development and training in Brunei Darussalam. For these purposes, the Royal Brunei Armed Forces is using anti-personnel mines that are not prohibited by the Convention.

⁷ In its reports submitted in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008, Burkina Faso indicated that "nothing yet" was retained.

⁸ In its report submitted in 2009, Burundi indicated that the Directorate of Humanitarian Mine and UXO Action, with the assistance of MAG Burundi, recovered 41 anti-personnel mines on 29 April 2009. The mines are currently stored in a MAG Burundi facility.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Canada ¹⁰	1781	1668	1712	1683	1935	1928	1907	1992	1963	1963	1939
Cape Verde											120
Central African Republic						0					
Chad ¹¹				0	0	0	0	0	0		0
Chile				28647	6245	6245	5895	4574	4484	4153	4083
Colombia				0	986	986	886	886	586	586	586
Comoros					0	0					
Congo (Brazzaville)				372		372	372	372	372		322
Cook Islands									0		
Costa Rica			0	0		0	0				
Côte d'Ivoire						0	0	0	0		0
Croatia	17500		7000	7000	6546	6478	6400	6236	6179	6103	6038
Cyprus						1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
Czech Republic		4859	4859	4849	4849	4849	4829	4829	4699	4699	2543
Democratic Republic of the Congo ¹²											
Denmark	4991	4934	2106	2091	2058	2058	1989	60	2008	2008	1990
Djibouti					2996	2996	2996				
Dominica				0	0	0	0				
Dominican Republic			0	0	0						0

⁹ In a report submitted prior to ratifying the Convention in 2001, Cameroon reported the same 500 mines under Article 4 and Article 3. The 3154 mines reported in 2005 also appeared in both Forms B and D. In its report submitted in 2009, Cameroon indicated in Form B that 1,885 mines were held and in Form D that some thousands of mines were held for training purposes.

¹⁰ 84 of the 1941 mines reported in 2007 are without fuses.

¹¹ In its report submitted in 2002, Chad reported that the quantity of mines retained for training purposes would be indicated in the next report.

¹² In its reports submitted in 2003, 2004, 2008 and 2009, the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that the decision concerning mines retained was pending.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Ecuador		16000	16000	4000	3970	3970	2001	2001	2001	1000 ¹³	1000
El Salvador			0	96	96	96	96	72			0
Equatorial Guinea											
Eritrea ¹⁴					222	222	9		109	109	109
Estonia							0		0	0	0
Ethiopia ¹⁵										1114	303
Fiji	0			0							
France	4361	4539	4476	4479	4462	4466	4455	4216	4170	4152	4144
Gabon				0							
Gambia											100
Germany	3006	2983	2753	2574	2555	2537	2496	2525	2526	2388	2437
Ghana				0							
Greece						7224	7224	7224	7224	7224	7224
Grenada			0			0					
Guatemala			0	0	0	0	0				0
Guinea						0					
Guinea Bissau ¹⁶				0	0			109		109	9
Guyana								0			
Haiti											0
Holy See	0			0	0	0	0	0	0		0
Honduras	1050		826			826		815	826		

¹³ In a statement received on 12 September 2007, Ecuador indicated that it destroyed 1,001 anti-personnel mines on 14 August 2007

¹⁴ In its report submitted in 2005, Eritrea indicated that the mines retained were inert. In its report submitted in 2007, Eritrea indicated that 9 of the 109 mines retained were inert. In its report submitted in 2008, Eritrea indicated that 8 of the 109 retained mines were inert.

¹⁵ At the 9MSP, Ethiopia indicated that 1,114 anti-personnel mines were going to be retained under Article 3.

¹⁶ In its reports submitted in 2004 and 2005, Guinea Bissau indicated that it would retain a very limited number of AP mines. In its reports submitted in 2006 and 2008, Guinea Bissau indicated that amongst the 109 retained mines, 50 POMZ2 and 50 PMD6 do not contain detonators or explosive. In its report submitted in 2009, Guinea Bissau indicated that the 50 POMZ2 were transferred for metal use and the 50 PMD6 were eliminated and used as wood.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Hungary	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500		0		0
Iceland				0	0	0	0				
Indonesia										4978	4978
Iraq										9	tbc
Ireland	130	129	127	125	116	103	85	77	75	70	67
Italy		8000	8000	7992	803	803	806	806	750	721	689
Jamaica		0		0	0	0	0		0		
Japan	15000	13852	12513	11223	9613	8359	6946	5350	4277	3712	3320
Jordan	1000	1000		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	950	950
Kenya			3000	3000		3000		3000		3000	
Kiribati			0			0					
Kuwait										0	0
Latvia								1301	902	899	899
Lesotho		0			0						
Liberia						0					
Liechtenstein		0	0	0	0	0	0		0		0
Lithuania ¹⁷				8091		3987			0		0
Luxembourg			998	998	988	976	956	956	900	855	
Madagascar			0								
Malawi ¹⁸					21	21	21				
Malaysia ¹⁹		0		0	0	0	0				0
Maldives				0							
Mali			3000		900	900	600				

¹⁷ In its report submitted in 2004, Lithuania indicated that fuses of MON-100 and OZM-72 mines had been changed to remotely-controlled and that they no longer fall under the Convention's definition of APMs. These mines will not appear in next year's exchange of information.

¹⁸ In its reports submitted in 2003 and 2004, Malawi indicated that mines declared under Article 3 were dummy mines.

¹⁹ In its reports submitted in 2004 and 2005, Malaysia indicated that, for the purpose of training, the Malaysian Armed Forces is using practice antipersonnel mines.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Malta				0	0	0	0				0
Mauritania ²⁰			5728	5728	843	728	728	728	728	728	728
Mauritius ²¹				93	93	0	0				
Mexico	0	0			0	0	0		0		0
Monaco			0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
Montenegro									0		0
Mozambique ²²		0	0	0	1427	1470	1470	1319	1265		1963
Namibia						9999	6151	3899			1734
Nauru						0					
Netherlands		4076	3532	4280	3866	3553	3176	2878	2735	2516	2413
New Zealand ²³	0		0	0	0	0	0		0		0
Nicaragua	1971		1971	1971	1971	1810	1040	1021	1004	1004	1004
Niger ²⁴				0	146	0	146	146			146
Nigeria						3364	0	0			3364
Niue	0			0							
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		0
Palau										0	
Panama				0	0						0
Papua New Guinea ²⁵											

²⁰ In its reports submitted in 2001 and 2002, the mines reported by Mauritania under Article 3 were also reported under Article 4.

²¹ In its reports submitted in 2002 and 2003, the mines reported by Mauritius under Article 3 were also reported under Article 4.

²² In its report submitted in 2009, Mozambique indicated that 520 of the retained mines were inherited from an NPA mine detection training camp. This camp is not used as training falls outside of the IND scope of work so the mines will be destroyed in June 2009.

²³ In its report submitted in 2007, New Zealand indicated that it retains operational stocks of M18A1 Claymores which are operated in the command-detonated mode only. Other than the M18A1 Claymores, the New Zealand Defence Force holds a very limited quantity of inert practice mines, used solely in the training of personnel in mine clearance operations, in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention.

²⁴ In its report submitted in 2003, the mines reported by Niger under Article 3 were also reported under Article 4.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Paraguay			0					0	0		
Peru		9526	5578	4024	4024	4024	4024	4012	4012	4000	4047
Philippines		0	0	0	0	0	0				
Portugal ²⁶		~3523	~3523	1115		1115	1115	1115	1115		760
Qatar					0	0					
Republic of Moldova				849		736	249	249	0		
Romania				4000	4000	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500
Rwanda ²⁷			0		101	101	101	101		65	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0										
Saint Lucia						0					
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines						0					
Samoa				0					0		
San Marino			0	0		0	0		0		0
Sao Tome and Principe									0		
Senegal ²⁸	0		0	0	0	0	0		24	24	28
Serbia ²⁹						5000	5000	5507		5565	3589
Seychelles					0		0				
Sierra Leone						0					
Slovakia	7000		1500	1500	1486	1481	1427	1427	1427	1422	1422
Slovenia	7000		7000	3000	3000	2999	2994	2993	2993	2992	2991

²⁵ In its report submitted in 2004, Papua New Guinea indicated that it had a small stock of command-detonated Claymore mines for training purposes only by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

²⁶ In its report submitted in 2000, Portugal indicated that only 3000 of the retained mines were active, the rest was inert.

²⁷ In its report submitted in 2003, Rwanda indicated that the 101 mines declared under Article 3 had been uprooted from minefields to be retained for training purposes.

²⁸ In its reports submitted in 2007 and 2008, Senegal indicated that the 24 mines it retains under Article 3 were found during demining operations or in rebel stocks held before they were destroyed in August-September 2006. These mines have been defused and are used to train deminers.

²⁹ In its report submitted in 2009, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 510 PMA-1 type and 560 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Solomon Islands						0					
South Africa ³⁰	11247	11247	4505	4455	4400	4414	4388	4433	4406	4380	4355
Spain ³¹	10000		4000	4000	4000	3815	2712	2712	2034	1994	1797
Sudan						5000	5000	10000	10000	4997	1938
Suriname ³²					296	296	150	150	150	0	
Swaziland		0									
Sweden ³³	0	0	11120	13948	16015	15706	14798	14402	10578	7531	7364
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tajikistan					255	255	255	225	105	0	0
Thailand ³⁴	15604	15604	5000	4970	4970	4970	4970	4761	4713	3650	3638
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	50			0	4000	4000	4000	0	0		0
Timor-Leste						0					
Togo					436	436					
Trinidad and Tobago				0		0		0			0
Tunisia		5000		5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	4995	4980
Turkey						16000	16000	15150	15150	15150	15125

³⁰ In its report submitted in 1999, South Africa indicated that 10992 of the 11247 mines declared under Article 3 were empty casings retained for training of members of the SNDF.

³¹ While Spain did not submit an Article 7 report in 2000, the report submitted in 2001 covered calendar year 2000.

³² In its report submitted in 2004, although Suriname reports 296 mines as retained under Article 3, it mentioned that from 1995 there were no mines retained for training in mine detection or clearance. In its report submitted in 2008, Suriname indicated that the last 146 mines retained under Article 3 were destroyed.

³³ In its report submitted in 2001, Sweden indicated that 11120 mines declared under Article 3 were complete mines or mines without fuses. In its report submitted in 2002, it indicated that 2840 of the declared mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies. In its report submitted in 2003, it indicated that 2782 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies. In its reports submitted in 2004 and 2005, it indicated that 2840 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies. In its report submitted in 2009, Sweden indicated that 2780 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies.

³⁴ In its Article 7 report submitted in 1999, Thailand indicated that the 15604 retained mines included 6117 Claymore mines.

State Party	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Turkmenistan ³⁵					69200		0				
Ukraine								1950	1950	223	211
Uganda				2400			1764			1764	1764
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ³⁶	4437	4519	4919	4949	4899	1930	1937	1795	650	609	903
United Republic of Tanzania					1146	1146	1146	1146	1102	950	1780
Uruguay				500		500				260	
Vanuatu								0			
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)				2214	5000		4960	4960	4960	4960	4960
Yemen	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000			
Zambia			6691			3346	3346	3346	3346	2232	2120
Zimbabwe ³⁷		946	700		700		700	700	700	600	550

³⁵ In its report submitted in 2004, Turkmenistan indicated that it started the process of destruction of 60000 antipersonnel mines in February 2004. In a statement to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention on 25 June 2004, it indicated that the remaining 9200 mines would be destroyed during the year.

³⁶ In its report submitted in 1999, the United Kingdom reported 2088 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2002, 1056 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2010, 434 inert training shapes and 859 mines of foreign manufacture. In its report submitted in 2000, it reported 2088 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2002, 1056 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2010, the inert shapes have been taken off the total since they don't fall under the Convention's definition of a mine and 1375 mines of foreign manufacture. In its report submitted in 2001, it reported 2088 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2002, 1056 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2010 and 1775 mines of foreign manufacture. In its report submitted in 2002, it reported 2088 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2002, 1056 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2010 and 1805 mines of foreign manufacture. In its report submitted in 2003, it reported 2088 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2002, (the UK is currently working towards their destruction), 1028 mines with a shelf life expiring on 1 August 2010 and 1783 mines of foreign manufacture.

³⁷ In its report submitted in 2008, Zimbabwe reported 700 mines retained for training in Form D and indicated that 100 had been destroyed during training in 2007 in Form B.

Key:

Number of mines reported retained in a particular year:	Numeric value
No report was submitted as required or a report was submitted but no number was entered in the relevant reporting form:	
No report was required:	

Table 2: Summary of additional information volunteered by the States Parties that reported anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for reasons permitted under Article 3

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
1. Afghanistan	Afghanistan reported that UNMACA uses retained anti-personnel mines in its test centres in Kabul and Kandahar to accredit the mine detection dogs of implementing partners and stores mines that may be needed in the future in a secure bunker. The implementing partners, under the oversight of UNMACA, use anti-personnel mines for training of their mine detection dogs and deminers.(2008)
2. Algeria	
3. Angola	
4. Argentina	<p>In 2005, Argentina reported that it estimated that mines will be used as follows in coming years: between 2005 and 2011, approximately 90 to 100 Type SB 33 and Type FMK-1 mines per year will be used to train Argentine army engineers; in 2005 and 2006, approximately 150 Type Expal P4B, 50 Type MFK1 and 50 Libyan anti-personnel mines will be used for the development and testing of the remote-controlled detection / destruction vehicle; in 2005 approximately 150 Type FMK1 and 150 Type Expal P4B mines will be used for the destruction of unexploded ordnance; and, between 2005 and 2010 approximately 40 Type Expal P4B, Type MFK1 and Libyan anti-personnel mines per year will be used be used in basic and advanced humanitarian demining courses, and, for EOD and demining training and for peace keeping forces. (2005)</p> <p>In 2006, Argentina reported that mines are retained by the navy for anti-personnel mines destruction training activities, more specifically to train marines engineers in destruction techniques. The development of an annual training programme will lead to the destruction of the 610 remaining mines retained by the navy by 2012. (2006)</p> <p>Argentina indicated that in 2007 the navy destroyed 81 mines SB-33 during training activities conducted by the Company of Amphibious Engineers on destruction techniques. The army retains mines to develop an unmanned vehicle for the detection and handling of mines and explosives. Development of this vehicle started on 1 March 2004 and is 60% complete. The vehicle is currently at the stage of assembling. During 2007 no mines were destroyed for this project. Mines are also retained by the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces to test</p>

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	charges for the destruction of UXO/mines. In 2007, 10 mines were destroyed in the testing grounds.(2008)
5. Australia	Australia reported that stocks were now centralised, with small numbers in ammunition depots throughout Australia to support regional training. Training is conducted by the School of Military Engineering in Sydney. Australia indicated that stock levels would be regularly reviewed and assessed, that only a realistic training quantity was held, and that this would be depleted over time. Stocks in excess of this figure will be destroyed on an ongoing basis. (2008)
6. Bangladesh	Bangladesh informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that mines were retained for training purposes, especially for officers and soldiers preparing for UN peacekeeping missions. (2005)
7. Belarus	
8. Belgium	Belgium reported that in 2004 and 2005, at the Engineering School, 106 mines were used to educate Officers, NCOs and privates as EOD personnel and that 517 mines were used for the training of Engineer Combat Units in demining and mine awareness. (2005, 2006) Belgium reported that in 2006 and 2007, 533 mines were used during different sessions of courses organised by the Belgian Armed Forces with the aim of educating and training EOD specialists and deminers with live ammunition and training militaries in mine risk education (2006-2007)
9. Benin	
10. Bhutan	
11. Bosnia and Herzegovina	
12. Brazil	Brazil reported that all mines retained for training shall be destroyed in training activities. The retention of these mines will allow the Brazilian Armed Forces to participate adequately in international demining activities. (2007) Brazil indicated that the Brazilian Army decided to keep its landmine stockpiles for the training of demining teams up to 2019, taking into consideration the prorogation of the deadline for the destruction of landmines, in accordance with Article 3.(2008)

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
13. Bulgaria	<p>In 2006, Bulgaria informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that so far retained mines had been used for training the engineer scientists participating in missions abroad and to study their destructive effect and develop technologies for PFM detection. The engineer specialists, officers and NSOs of the Bulgarian Armed Forces are trained on issues related to anti-personnel mines identification, demining and antipersonnel mines destruction at the Defence Staff College, the National Military University and at the Engineer Units of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Training is oriented towards awareness of the tactical and technical features of mines, awareness of and application techniques for demining minefields left after military operations during peacekeeping operations, defusing single mines and anti-personnel mines used as a component of improvised explosive device. (2006)</p>
14. Burundi	
15. Cameroon	
16. Canada	<p>In 2005, Canada informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that since entry into force it had used 180 Type M-14 mines for research and training, noting the value of this mine for these purposes being its low metal content and that it is found in many mine-affected countries. In addition, Canada informed the Standing Committee that 8 Type PMR-2A mines were used to test and evaluate personal protective equipment given that the fragment velocity and size of this mine is quite different from other mines and because it too is found in many mine-affected countries. As well, Canada indicated that 102 Type PMA-2 mines were used to test and evaluate metal detectors and instrumented prodders as this mine represents a difficult target for detection and to test and evaluate protective equipment. (2005)</p> <p>In 2005-2006, Canada also reported 157 anti-personnel mines transferred from Afghanistan to train Canadian soldiers with anti-personnel mines they are currently facing in Afghanistan. (2006)</p> <p>Canada reported that it retains live anti-personnel mines to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live anti-personnel mines and to demonstrate the effect of landmines. For example, live mines help determine whether suits, boots and shields will adequately protect personnel who clear mines. The live mines</p>

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	<p>are used by the Defence department's research establishment located at Suffield, Alberta and by various military training establishments across Canada. The Department of National Defence represents the only source of anti-personnel mines which can be used by Canadian industry to test equipment. Since the last report Canada has not acquired or used anti-personnel mines mainly due to the closure of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies. A variety of anti-personnel mines are necessary for training soldiers in mine detection and clearance. Counter-mine procedures and equipment developed by Canada's research establishment must also be tested on different types of mines member of the Canadian Forces or other organisations might encounter during demining operations. The Department of National Defence retains a maximum of 2,000. This number is to ensure Canada has a sufficient number of mines for training and for valid testing in the area of mine detection and clearance. Canada will continue to conduct trials, testing and evaluation as new technologies are developed. There will be a continuing requirement for provision of real mine targets and simulated minefields for research and development of detection technologies. (2008)</p>
17. Cape Verde	
18. Chile	<p>In 2006, Chile reported that its retained anti-personnel mines were under the control of the army and the navy. In 2005, training courses in detection, disposal, and destruction of anti-personnel mines were organized for deminers, A humanitarian demining training was carried out for the demining unit of the navy. Training activities will include courses in detection, disposal, and destruction of antipersonnel mines for the Azapa and Punta Arenas Engineering Battalions, a demining course for the Atacama Engineering Battalion.(2006)</p> <p>In 2006, 39 mines were destroyed in anti-personnel mines detection, disposal, and destruction training courses organized for deminers at the School of Military Engineers of the Army. 1,357 mines were destroyed in anti-personnel mines detection, disposal, and destruction training courses organized for the Army's Demining Training Unit in Regions I, II and XII. 15 mines were destroyed to prepare the Partida de Operaciones de Minas Terrestres (Chilean Navy's demining unit) in humanitarian demining. Chile plans to use another 300 mines in 2007 in the course of its training activities. These activities include courses in detection, disposal, and destruction of anti-personnel mines for the Azapa, Atacama and Punta Arenas Engineering Battalions and the Navy demining units and regular courses for Engineer Officers and Sub-Officers at the School of Military Engineers.(2007)</p>

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	<p>In 2007, 328 mines were destroyed in anti-personnel mines detection, disposal, and destruction training courses organized for deminers at the School of Military Engineers of the Army. 3 mines were destroyed to prepare the Partida de Operaciones de Minas Terrestres (Chilean Navy's demining unit) in humanitarian demining.(2008)</p>
19. Colombia	
20. Congo	
21. Croatia	<p>In 2005, Croatia informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that the main purpose in retaining mines was to test demining machines. In addition, it indicated that in 2004, the Centre for Testing, Development and Training was established with its primary task being to test demining machines, mine detection dogs and metal detectors, and, to undertake research and development of other demining techniques and technologies. Croatia estimated that 189 mines would be needed in 2005. (2005)</p> <p>Croatia reported that in 2005, during testing and evaluating of demining machines on the test polygon in Cerovec, CROMAC-CTDT Ltd. used and destroyed 164 mines. These mines were used to test the following machines: excavator "MT-01", working tools – machine "MINE-WOLF", working tools –machine "MFV 1200", machine "M-FV 2500/580", machine "MVR-01", machine "MV-10", excavator "ORKA". (2006)</p> <p>Croatia informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that in 2006, 57 anti-personnel mines were used for testing of demining machines. The main purpose for which retained mines were used up to date is testing demining machines Bo.ena 5 and Mini .MINE-WOLF and RM-KA 02. Only after comprehensive testing the machines would receive appropriate certification which would enable them to operate in Croatia and beyond.(2007)</p>
22. Cyprus	<p>In 2006, Cyprus informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that the retained mines were used by the National Guard for the training of conscripts. Training included tracing techniques, reconnaissance, clearance and destruction of anti-personnel mines. After the completion of training all anti-personnel mines were collected and stored in specially designed warehouses. Cyprus indicated that the mines might be used for</p>

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	testing new means and systems for tracing and detecting antipersonnel mines. (2006)
23. Czech Republic	The Czech Republic reported that there is no specific action plan on how to use the retained mines, the principle is to use them for EOD/engineer units training to detect and destroy anti-personnel mines.(2007)
24. Denmark	Denmark reported that its retained mines are used as follows: a demonstration of the effects of anti-personnel mines is given to all recruits during training; during training of engineer units for international tasks, instructors in mine awareness are trained to handle anti-personnel mines; and, during training of ammunition clearing units, anti-personnel mines are used for training in ammunition dismantling. Anti-personnel mines are not used for the purpose of training in mine laying.(2008)
25. Djibouti	
26. Ecuador	
27. Eritrea	
28. Ethiopia	
29. France	France reported that its retained mines were used to: 1) test mine detection devices, including the “Mine Picker”, a mine detection robot developed by Pegase Instrumentation (the cost-efficiency study carried out in 2007 concluded that this project would be abandoned) and the MMSR-SYDERA system. 2) to assess the anti-personnel mine threat, 3) to test protective anti-personnel boots (no tests having been carried out since 2005, France does not plan to continue with this activity).(2008)
30. Gambia	
31. Germany	Germany reported that 41 mines were used in 2004 by the Federal Armed Forces for neutralization of fuses and for the “Wolf” Light Truck mine protection programme. In addition, Germany reported that mines are retained for demining research and development, dog training and for testing the “Rhino” demining machine. (2005)

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	<p>Germany reported that it retained anti-personnel mines under Article 3 with the following objectives 1) detection and demining equipment research and testing, 2) vehicle mine protection programme, 3) mine detection dogs, and 4) accident research, for the following projects/activities: 1) Mobile Minesearch and Clearing system, 2) Modular Fragment Protection, 3) Regular dog training at the Dog Handling Centre where the anti-personnel mines are placed in permanent search fields with fusing mechanisms partly or entirely removed. In 2006 at the Federal Armed Forces Technical Centre 91, 14 anti-personnel mines were used for the vehicle mine protection programme and accident research, 5 anti-personnel mines were destroyed, 20 anti-personnel mines type MRUD were delivered from the Balkans and 19 antipersonnel mines were transferred to Rheinmetall Unterlüss.(2007)</p> <p>At the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Germany reported that pursuant to Article 3, it has set itself an upper ceiling of 3,000 anti-personnel mines to the maximum. These stocks of APMs clearly earmarked and stored for non-operational purposes, are regarded as necessary for the effective continuation and improvement of the protection of Germany's deployed soldiers against anti-personnel mines. The available anti-personnel mines pool enables a cost-saving and efficient execution of technical examinations in the area of Force Protection. Due to the International Test and Evaluation Programme for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP), many efforts have been undertaken to test and evaluate mine action equipments, systems and technologies. Nevertheless, efforts have continued in order to develop field equipment and tools based on realistic and future needs for the Federal Armed Forces. (2008)</p> <p>At the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in 2009, Germany reported that all together since 1998, it has used up a total of 685 antipersonnel mines for testing. For training purposes, German Armed Forces are using dummies. In 2008, Germany decided to set up a special test field for testing multiple sensor mine detection and search systems. The implementation of the project will take place in 2009 at the Federal Armed Forces Technical Centre 52 (WTD 52) in Bavaria. Germany offers available test capabilities for testing procedures on handheld systems – beginning in 2010 – to NATO Member States as well as to Partners in the International Test and Evaluation Programme for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP). In 2007, at the Federal Armed Forces Technical</p>

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	Centre 91, 14 anti-personnel mines were used for the vehicle mine protection programme, In 2008, German Armed Forces used 7 anti-personnel mines for testing purposes. 5 mines were used for vehicles mine protection programmes, 2 mines were used for analysis of IED attacks on German Armed Forces.
32. Greece	
33. Guinea-Bissau	Guinea Bissau indicated that the 109 retained antipersonnel mine are retained by the armed forces of Guinea Bissau, 100 of which do not contain detonators or explosive. These mines are retained to train military deminers regarding how mines work and in recognition training. (2006)
34. Honduras	In 2006, Honduras informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that plans for use of retained mines included: training of engineering staff to support demining work in countries affected by mines, and training to deal with the reported presence of mines in Honduras.(2006)
35. Indonesia	Indonesia reported that the anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 will be used as instruction/teaching materials which will further enhance the students capability to identify, detect and destruct landmines in general, particularly in preparing Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping operations.(2008)
36. Iraq	
37. Ireland	
38. Italy	Italy indicated that warfare mines are utilized for bomb disposals and pioneers training courses. Four such training courses are organised every year.(2008)
39. Japan	In 2008, At the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Japan indicated that in accordance with the exceptions in Article 3, Japan has used anti-personnel mines for the purposes of training in mine detection, mine clearance, and mine destruction techniques, as well as for developing mine detection and mine clearance equipment. Within its annual Article 7 reports, Japan supplied information on the use of its retained mines and the results of such use. Specifically, Japan provided data on: (1) mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques developed and under development; (2) training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction; and (3) the number of personnel trained. In 2008, Japan plans to use anti-personnel landmines retained under Article 3 for the purpose of training infantry and engineering units of the Self Defense Force in mine detection and mine clearance.

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	In accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, Japan retains anti-personnel mines for the purpose of training in and development of mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction techniques (At the time of entry into force in 1999: 15,000 retained. As of December 2007: 3,712 retained). However, the number possessed is the minimum absolutely necessary for training the Self Defense Force units and technology development trails. Japan reported that it consumed 565 mines in 2007 for education and training in mine detection and mine clearance, and for the development of mine detectors and mine clearance equipment. (2008)
40. Jordan	In 2007, Jordan reported at the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that NPA-Jordan carried out mine detection training of 4 new mine detection dog teams in May 2007 and July 2007 using a total of 50 retained mines. Training took place in the south of Jordan for the Wadi Araba/Aqaba Mine Clearance Project as well as in the north of Jordan for the Northern Border Project. The MDD Teams are trained by first creating a sample mine field using a small number of retained mines of the same type the MDD teams will be expected to encounter. The mines are laced in the ground prior to the training. The training is then carried out by the MDD teams in order for the dogs to learn to recognize the scent of those particular mines. (2008)
41. Kenya	In 2006, Kenya informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that 540 anti-personnel mines had been used for the purposes described under Article 3. These mines were consumed during humanitarian demining and EODs training, demolition/destruction practical exercises and mine awareness training to peacekeeping contingents deployed to various missions.(2007)
42. Latvia	Latvia indicated that there were no reasons for retaining mines other than training EOD experts for participation in international operations. In 2007, 3 mines were destroyed during mine destruction training.(2008)
43. Luxembourg	
44. Malawi	
45. Mali	
46. Mauritania	In 2006, Mauritania informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that of the 728 mines retained, 85 are held in training centres and 643 will be used for training activities as well once the

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	mines held in training centres will have been destroyed. (2006)
47. Mozambique	
48. Namibia	Namibia indicated that the mines will be used during training of its troops and deminers so that they can identify and learn to detect, handle, neutralize and destroy the mines whenever they are found. Training is still under way during the period under review and the number of mines retained will decrease further as the training continues.
49. Netherlands	In 2006, the Netherlands informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that the training programmes for which the retained mines are used consist of instructing all military personnel in mine awareness, how to act in a mined area and what to do to safely get out. This training forms part of the basis of every military instruction in the Netherlands, and are intensified prior to all troop deployments. Annually around 7,000 military receive the initial training on awareness. Moreover 450 military engineers are being trained annually to defuse or destruct anti-personnel mines, and to clear mined minefields and other mined areas. In addition, the Netherlands indicated that it retains mines for technical development. The research conducted is aimed at the development of new and improved detection and clearance technologies, as well as simulation mines. The Netherlands does not have yet such simulation mines at its disposal, but plans to replace part of the currently retained mines by simulations when possible.(2006)
50. Nicaragua	In 2006-2007, Nicaragua reported that a total of 36 mines were destroyed in training during 2006. 10 PPMISR11 mines were destroyed in November 2005-May 2006 during a humanitarian demining training course. In addition, 26 PMN mines were deactivated, their explosive parts being removed (charge and detonator), with the aim of using them for retraining and verification of detectors used in the front lines of operations. These mines can be considered destroyed or unusable, since the removed parts were destroyed and can no longer be restored in their technical capacity to function as anti-personnel mines.(2007)
51. Niger	
52. Peru	
53. Portugal	

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
54. Romania	
55. Rwanda	In 2007, Rwanda reported that the 65 mines retained under Article 3 were uprooted from minefields to (a) train deminers to IMAS, (b) to practice EOD personnel and c) to train mine detection dogs. So far 25 EOD personnel have been trained into 5 EOD technicians, 10 operators and 10 Recce agents. (2008)
56. Senegal	
57. Serbia	In 2008, Serbia reported at the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that mines retained in accordance with Article 3 were retained in depots at 3 locations in the Republic of Serbia. They were retained for the purpose of organizing personnel training for probable engagement in UN peace operations, protection equipment testing and mine detectors. From December 2007 to March 2008, the ITF and the Government Centre for Demining of the Republic of Serbia organised and carried out a basic demining and battle area clearance course using different type of exercise mines and ammunition provided by the Ministry of Defence. 35 participants completed the basic course and 7 of them completed an additional course for team leaders for bomb disposal officers.(2008)
58. Slovakia	
59. Slovenia	
60. South Africa	<p>South Africa reported that of the 4 323 anti-personnel mines retained by Defence-Tek, 6 were used for development and training techniques during 2005. Another 116 anti-personnel mines are kept by the South African Police Service (SAPS) Explosive Unit, Head of Bomb Disposal and Research. The SAPS has indicated that all POMZ 2M mines are empty, with the exception of the Shrapnel No 2, PRB series and the J- 69 have been deactivated. Shrapnel No 2 anti-personnel mines are command wires initiation only. 3 antipersonnel mines were used for training by the SAPS and one was rendered safe for training purposes. South Africa reported additional mines retained to be used in accordance with Article 3 as a result of the completion of criminal investigations. (2006)</p> <p>South Africa indicated that 4,291 mines were retained by Defencetek, as formally mandated by Ministerial authorization dated 7 March 2006 and 89 were retained by the South African Police Service, Explosive Unit, Office</p>

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	<p>Bomb Disposal and Research. Of the 4,317 anti-personnel retained by the Department of Defence reported in 2007, 6 anti-personnel mines were used in accordance with Article 3. Of the 109 antipersonnel mines retained by the South African Police Service reported in 2007, 21 were used in accordance with Article 3 and one additional anti-personnel mine, a MON 50, was recovered from an arms cache and retained for training purposes. (2008)</p> <p>In 2008, of the 89 anti-personnel mines retained by the SAPS, 25 were used in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention (2009).</p>
61. Spain	Spain reported that from 4,000 mines retained in accordance with Article 3, 1,288 anti-personnel mines were used for research and training in demining techniques at the International Centre for Demining.
62. Sudan	
63. Sweden	Sweden reported that in 2005, 56 Truppmina 10 type mines, 328 mines without fuses and 331 Trampmina type 49 B mines, were used for the training of personnel.(2006)
64. Thailand	
65. Togo	
66. Tunisia	
67. Turkey	In 2009, Turkey informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that in 2008 training activities for military personnel included, i) training at Engineers Schools, ii) courses on mines and booby-traps, iii) mobile training on mines and IEDs, iv) mine, counter mine and EOD course held in the PFP Training Centre. Mines were also used for the Mine proof Boot Development project.
68. Ukraine	Ukraine indicated that 1,727 mines were destroyed and used for personal protective equipment for deminers.(2008)
69. Uganda	Uganda informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that retained mines had been used for mine detection, clearance and destruction training and to provide refresher training to army engineers conducting EOD response operations. In addition a 3-week predeployment training for humanitarian mine detection, clearance and EOD was given to 20 army engineers

State Party	Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	seconded to the Office of the Prime Minister/Mine Action Centre. (2006)
70. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The United Kingdom indicated that anti-personnel mines are retained with the objective of identifying APM threat to UK forces and maintaining and improving detection, protection, clearance and destruction techniques. In 2006 1,248 anti-personnel mines were destroyed because they were unsafe.(2007)
71. United Republic of Tanzania	<p>In 2006, the United Republic of Tanzania informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that 369 anti-personnel mines were retained to train troops and 777 are for the APOPO project. This project trains sniffer rats to detect explosives. It has about 250 mine detection rats (MDR) bred and trained by 77 staff and produced 18 MDR teams currently carrying out operations in Mozambique. The APOPO Project has used 44 of the 777 retained, so the United Republic of Tanzania currently retains 1,102 anti-personnel mines. Since the Great Lake Region countries have committed to utilise MDR in their humanitarian demining efforts, the Tanzanian Government plans to increase the number of trained MDR to respond to the demand from these countries.(2006)</p> <p>In 2007, The United Republic of Tanzania reported that the Great Lake Region countries plan to utilize mine detection rats in their humanitarian demining efforts, so the Government of Tanzania requested 1,000 deactivated anti-personnel mines from the Government of Mozambique with the aim of training more MDR to respond to the demand of these countries.(2007)</p>
72. Uruguay	
73. Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of)	
74. Yemen	In its transparency report submitted in 2007, Yemen indicated that retained anti-personnel mines are used train dogs.

75. Zambia	<p>In 2009, Zambia informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that theoretical training has continued to be conducted in which trainees are exposed to the different types of mines retained for identification purposes. No practical field training has been conducted since 2007 due to budgetary constraints. Zambia Defence Force personnel on assignments to various peacekeeping operations undergo intensive mine detection during pre-deployment training and these have proven to be reliable in dealing with mines and other ordnance in the mission areas. In addition, Zambia noted that a major benefit on the usage of retained mines for training has been the cost-effectiveness of ridding the country of mines and UXO as the national capacity has professionally conducted mine clearance in suspected areas across the country at a much reduced cost.</p>
76. Zimbabwe	<p>Zimbabwe reported that retained mines will be used during training of Zimbabwe's troops and deminers in order to enable them to identify and learn how to detect, handle, neutralise and destroy the mines in Zimbabwean minefields. (2008)</p>

Annex XI

The status of legal measures in accordance with Article 9

A. States Parties that have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of article 9 obligations

1. Albania
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Belarus
5. Belgium
6. Belize
7. Bosnia and Herzegovina
8. Brazil
9. Burkina Faso
10. Burundi
11. Cambodia
12. Canada
13. Chad
14. Colombia
15. Cook Islands
16. Costa Rica
17. Croatia
18. Cyprus
19. Czech Republic
20. Djibouti
21. El Salvador
22. France
23. Germany
24. Guatemala
25. Honduras
26. Hungary
27. Iceland
28. Ireland
29. Italy
30. Japan
31. Jordan
32. Kiribati
33. Latvia
34. Liechtenstein
35. Luxembourg
36. Malaysia
37. Mali
38. Malta
39. Mauritania
40. Mauritius
41. Monaco
42. New Zealand
43. Nicaragua
44. Niger
45. Norway
46. Peru
47. St Vincent and the Grenadines
48. Senegal
49. Seychelles
50. South Africa
51. Spain
52. Sweden
53. Switzerland
54. Trinidad and Tobago
55. Turkey
56. United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
57. Yemen
58. Zambia
59. Zimbabwe

B. States Parties that have reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient in the context of article 9 obligations

1. Algeria
2. Andorra
3. Argentina
4. Bulgaria
5. Central African Republic
6. Chile
7. Denmark
8. Estonia
9. Ethiopia
10. Greece
11. Guinea-Bissau
12. Holy See
13. Indonesia
14. Kuwait
15. Lesotho
16. Lithuania
17. Mexico
18. Montenegro
19. Namibia
20. Netherlands
21. Papua New Guinea
22. Portugal
23. Republic of Moldova
24. Romania
25. Samoa
26. Slovakia
27. Slovenia
28. Tajikistan
29. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
30. Tunisia
31. Ukraine
32. United Republic of Tanzania
33. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

C. States Parties that have not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 legislation or that they consider existing laws are sufficient

1. Afghanistan
2. Angola
3. Antigua and Barbuda
4. Bahamas
5. Bangladesh
6. Barbados
7. Benin
8. Bhutan
9. Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
10. Botswana
11. Brunei Darussalam
12. Cameroon
13. Cape Verde
14. Comoros
15. Congo
16. Côte d'Ivoire
17. Democratic Republic of the Congo
18. Dominica
19. Dominican Republic
20. Ecuador
21. Equatorial Guinea
22. Eritrea
23. Fiji
24. Gabon
25. Gambia
26. Ghana
27. Grenada
28. Guinea
29. Guyana
30. Haiti
31. Iraq
32. Jamaica
33. Kenya
34. Liberia
35. Madagascar
36. Malawi
37. Maldives
38. Mozambique
39. Nauru
40. Nigeria
41. Niue
42. Palau
43. Panama
44. Paraguay
45. Philippines
46. Qatar
47. Rwanda
48. Saint Kitts and Nevis
49. Saint Lucia
50. San Marino
51. Sao Tome and Principe
52. Serbia
53. Sierra Leone
54. Solomon Islands
55. Sudan
56. Suriname
57. Swaziland
58. Thailand
59. Timor-Leste
60. Togo
61. Turkmenistan
62. Uganda
63. Uruguay
64. Vanuatu

Annex XII

States Parties that have served as Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs, 1999-2009

	General Status and Operation of the Convention	Stockpile Destruction	Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration¹	Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies²	Technologies for Mine Action³
1999 - 2000	Co-Chairs: - Canada & South Africa Co-Rapporteurs: - Belgium & Zimbabwe	Co-Chairs: - Hungary & Mali Co-Rapporteurs: - Malaysia & Slovakia	Co-Chairs: - Mexico & Switzerland Co-Rapporteurs: - Japan & Nicaragua	Co-Chairs: - Mozambique & United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Co-Rapporteurs: - the Netherlands & Peru	Co-Chairs: - Cambodia & France Co-Rapporteurs: - Germany & Yemen
2000 - 2001	Co-Chairs: - Belgium & Zimbabwe Co-Rapporteurs: - Norway & Thailand	Co-Chairs: - Malaysia & Slovakia Co-Rapporteurs: - Australia & Croatia	Co-Chairs: - Japan & Nicaragua Co-Rapporteurs: - Canada & Honduras	Co-Chairs: - the Netherlands & Peru Co-Rapporteurs: - Germany & Yemen	

¹ Until the end of the 2000-2001 Intersessional Work Programme, this Standing Committee was called the “Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness”.

² Until the end of the 1999-2000 Intersessional Work Programme, this Standing Committee was called “the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance” when it was merged with the “Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Action Technologies” to become the “Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies.” Following the end of the 2000-2001 Intersessional Work Programme, it became the “Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies”, with the name again changing following the 2001-2002 Intersessional Work Programme to become the “Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies”.

³ At the Second Meeting of the States Parties, the decision was taken to merge “the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance” and the “Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Action Technologies” into the “Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies.”

	General Status and Operation of the Convention	Stockpile Destruction	Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration¹	Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies²	Technologies for Mine Action³
2001 - 2002	Co-Chairs: - Norway & Thailand Co-Rapporteurs: - Austria & Peru	Co-Chairs: - Australia & Croatia Co-Rapporteurs: - Romania and Switzerland	Co-Chairs: - Canada & Honduras Co-Rapporteurs: - Colombia & France	Co-Chairs: - Germany & Yemen Co-Rapporteurs: - Belgium & Kenya	
2002 - 2003	Co-Chairs: - Austria & Peru Co-Rapporteurs: - Mexico & the Netherlands	Co-Chairs: - Romania and Switzerland Co-Rapporteurs: - Guatemala & Italy	Co-Chairs: - Colombia & France Co-Rapporteurs: - Australia & Croatia	Co-Chairs: - Belgium & Kenya Co-Rapporteurs: - Cambodia & Japan	
2003 - 2004	Co-Chairs: - Mexico & the Netherlands Co-Rapporteurs: - New Zealand & South Africa	Co-Chairs: - Guatemala & Italy Co-Rapporteurs: - Bangladesh & Canada	Co-Chairs: - Australia & Croatia Co-Rapporteurs: - Nicaragua & Norway	Co-Chairs: - Cambodia & Japan Co-Rapporteurs: - Algeria and Sweden	
2004 - 2005	Co-Chairs: - New Zealand & South Africa Co-Rapporteurs: - Belgium & Guatemala	Co-Chairs: - Bangladesh & Canada Co-Rapporteurs: - Japan & United Republic of Tanzania	Co-Chairs: - Nicaragua & Norway Co-Rapporteurs: - Afghanistan & Switzerland	Co-Chairs: - Algeria and Sweden Co-Rapporteurs: - Jordan & Slovenia	

	General Status and Operation of the Convention	Stockpile Destruction	Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration¹	Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies²	Technologies for Mine Action³
2005 - 2006	Co-Chairs: - Belgium & Guatemala Co-Rapporteurs: - Argentina & Italy	Co-Chairs: - Japan & United Republic of Tanzania Co-Rapporteurs: - Algeria & Estonia	Co-Chairs: - Afghanistan & Switzerland Co-Rapporteurs: - Austria & Sudan	Co-Chairs: - Jordan & Slovenia Co-Rapporteurs: - Chile & Norway	
2006 - 2007	Co-Chairs: - Argentina & Italy Co-Rapporteurs: - Germany & Kenya	Co-Chairs: - Algeria & Estonia Co-Rapporteurs: - Lithuania & Serbia	Co-Chairs: - Austria & Sudan Co-Rapporteurs: - Cambodia & New Zealand	Co-Chairs: - Chile & Norway Co-Rapporteurs: - Canada & Peru	
2007 - 2008	Co-Chairs: - Germany & Kenya Co-Rapporteurs: - Chile & Japan	Co-Chairs: - Lithuania & Serbia Co-Rapporteurs: - Italy & Zambia	Co-Chairs: - Cambodia & New Zealand Co-Rapporteurs: - Belgium & Thailand	Co-Chairs: - Canada & Peru Co-Rapporteurs: - Argentina & Australia	
2008 - 2009	Co-Chairs: - Chile & Japan Co-Rapporteurs: - Ecuador & Slovenia	Co-Chairs: - Italy & Zambia Co-Rapporteurs: - Bulgaria & Indonesia	Co-Chairs: - Belgium & Thailand Co-Rapporteurs: - Peru & Turkey	Co-Chairs: - Argentina & Australia Co-Rapporteurs: - Greece & Nigeria	

Annex XIII

ISU Trust Fund Contributions 2001 to 2009

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total Contributions
Albania						CHF1'000	CHF1'000	CHF1'000		CHF3'000
Australia	CHF25'668		CHF45'045	CHF29'011	CHF38'572	CHF76'044	CHF80'104	CHF63'000	CHF86'500	CHF443'944
Austria		CHF8'030		CHF70'380	CHF70'840		CHF89'970	CHF55'873		CHF295'093
Belgium		CHF12'012	CHF14'470		CHF23'094	CHF38'492	CHF48'535			CHF136'603
Bosnia & Herzegovina					CHF2'560					CHF2'560
Burundi						CHF600				CHF600
Canada		CHF92'589	CHF46'553	CHF47'789	CHF57'137	CHF53'660	CHF105'619	CHF18'936	CHF139'362	CHF561'644
Chile				CHF11'500	CHF24'300	CHF18'150	CHF17'530	CHF15'285	CHF21'281	CHF108'046
Croatia			CHF1'357	CHF2'580						CHF3'937
Czech Republic			CHF39'375	CHF37'295	CHF38'010	CHF56'691	CHF58'593	CHF67'040		CHF297'004
Cyprus						CHF2'700		CHF2'700	CHF4,560	CHF9'960
Estonia						CHF2'340	CHF4'056			CHF6'396
Germany			CHF38'250	CHF37'500		CHF23'357	CHF24'229	CHF24'299	CHF60'448	CHF207'809
Hungary				CHF12'400	CHF12'700	CHF12'500	CHF10'927	CHF10'737		CHF59'264
Iceland			CHF6'550	CHF10'000	CHF1'300					CHF17'850
Ireland		CHF73'990			CHF53'900		CHF24'445	CHF55'081		CHF207'415
Italy		CHF78'408	CHF120'218	CHF60'000	CHF61'600	CHF71'550	CHF80'240	CHF64'796		CHF536'812
Lithuania					CHF5'345		CHF10'000			CHF15'345
Luxembourg					CHF23'100					CHF23'100
Malaysia				CHF1'833		CHF5'162		CHF1'774		CHF8'769
Malta						CHF750	CHF1'800			CHF2'550
Mexico		CHF8'880		CHF7'500	CHF12'300	CHF6'250				CHF34'930
Netherlands		CHF94'032		CHF63'000	CHF7'000	CHF32'000				CHF196'032

New Zealand			CHF19'064							CHF19'064
Nigeria					CHF2'460	CHF3'630				CHF6'090
Norway	CHF96'698	CHF100'778	CHF91'750	CHF101'667	CHF108'962	CHF113'610	CHF161'526	CHF157'558	CHF130'846	CHF1'063'395
Philippines						CHF1'300				CHF1'300
Qatar								CHF11'921		CHF11'921
Senegal						CHF4'827				CHF4'827
South Africa	CHF4'976					CHF5'305				CHF10'281
Slovenia						CHF6'496	CHF6'740	CHF7'907		CHF21'143
Spain						CHF7'950	CHF48'660	CHF44'133	CHF59'732	CHF160'475
Sweden			CHF34'068				CHF35'058			CHF69'126
Thailand			CHF6'950							CHF6'950
Turkey					CHF1'200	CHF1'250	CHF1'753	CHF1'974	CHF3'348	CHF9'525
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland				CHF11'168						CHF11'168
	CHF127'342	CHF468'719	CHF463'650	CHF503'623	CHF544'379	CHF545'614	CHF810'783	CHF606'020	CHF506'078	CHF4'173'102